



THE IMPACT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ON INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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
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PREFACE

The study aims at the various aspects of the Afghan problem and their impact on India-Pakistan relations. It centres round the five propositions:

- (i) Afghanistan had always been the most important factor in influencing India before 1947. After the emergence of Pakistan, it has also continually been influencing India-Pakistan relations;
- (ii) The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, both the cause as well as the consequence of the Super-power rivalry in the Indian Ocean area, particularly the 'Arch of crisis' extending from Afghanistan to Ethiopia with Iran in the middle, takes both India and Pakistan in this geopolitical sweep;
- (iii) India and Pakistan as such were immediately and directly involved in the crisis created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;
- (iv) India-Pakistan relations, instead of being a model of good-neighbourly relations, have been characterised by suspicion and hostility since 1947. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, increasing militarisation of Pakistan, ever developing Sino-Pak-US axis and also growing domestic instability in India, have added new dimensions to India-Pakistan relations;

(v) The implications arising out of such developments point out the necessity of co-operation between the two countries so as to minimise the super-power presence in the region and thereby reduce tensions.

It is in the context of these propositions that the present work deals India-Pakistan relations in the shadow of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The method of presentation of the material is mainly comparative with a chronological order. The dissertation, though involving considerable empirical research, takes on analytical approach to explain the essentials of the matter. I have based the study largely on the periodicals, journals, magazines and newspapers. In addition, rich and varied literature on Afghanistan, both before and after the Soviet intervention, and India-Pakistan relations has also been utilised.

I must record my gratitude to Professor S.A.H. Bilgrami, Chairman, Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh, who has kindly supervised this work. I am grateful to all the staff members of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh for the benefits I have derived from their knowledge and inspiration. I also owe much to Mr A.L. Kapoor, Librarian, Ratan Tata Library, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, for providing me the required material. My thanks are also due to Dr Sayeed Ahmed Khan, Department of Geography, A.M.U. Aligarh

for the immense help rendered to me in the preparation of the strategic map of Afghanistan; to Mr Luckinder Singh for proof reading; and to Mr Naseem and Mohammad Khalid for the help rendered to me while completing this dissertation. I am very much obliged to Miss Ranjna Singh, University of Delhi, for providing me an unflinching co-operation in this task. I express my feeling of gratitude to all my friends and well-wishers. It is almost beyond my ability to speak of my father's co-operation.

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I also thank, Mr S.M. Qamar Alam, Stenographer, Department of Political Science who has typed these pages efficiently.

As regards various inconsistencies and shortcomings on account of argumentative deficiencies or fallacious style I alone am to be blamed.

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INTRODUCTION

An attempt has been made in these pages to study the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on India-pakistan relations. Afghanistan has been the vital factor in India's security, as it provided the historical invasion routes to the Indian sub-continent. Also, she formed the cultural province of India. But the constant struggle over this strategic highland began from the competition and confrontation between Czarist Russia, which was expanding to the South to have, as the British saw, an access towards the warm waters of the Indian ocean, and the British Empire, which wanted to protect the outer perimeter of its dominion over India. Also, in order to have the British more conciliatory in Europe, the Russians tried to humiliate them on Indo-Afghan borders. Thus, Afghanistan has been very significant in the regional as well as the global strategy influencing not only the course of events in the Indian sub-continent but also in Europe and the world at large.

The emergence of Pakistan somewhat lessened the strategic importance of Afghanistan. Even before the birth of Pakistan, on July 17, 1947, the US secretary of state George Marshall, in a memorandum to the President Truman referring to Pakistan said,

"Pakistan ... will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world." After the emergence of Pakistan, the United States sought to develop better relations both with Pakistan and India, by extending alliances to them. India declined but Pakistan joined - perhaps in view of her disputes with India over Kashmir, and with Afghanistan over Pakhtoonistan. Consequently, Afghanistan received low priority in the US strategy till the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. And she was eventually impelled to go to the Soviet side for economic and military aid, trade, and external support on Afghanistan's stand over Pakhtoonistan. The cumulation of the relations arising out of the Soviet support and the situational compulsions arising out of its neglect by the United States, along with internal political dissensions among the political leaders in Afghanistan, resulted in the Soviet military intervention.

The Soviet intervention had certain implications in India-Pakistan relations. As it will be seen in the following pages, there has been a mutual acrimony between the two countries from the very beginning since 1947. In addition to the Kashmir problem, mutual distrust and suspicion inherited from the partition have characterized their relations resulting into three wars in three decades. Besides their bilateral issue, certain external factors have also influenced their relations. India's stand over Pakhtoonistan in Favour of Afghanistan after 1960s, Indo-Soviet

cooperation with the Soviet support to the Indian cause on the one hand, US-pak-China strategic consensus on the other are such factors adversely affecting the relations between India and Pakistan. Further, Afghanistan's stand over Kashmir slightly in India's favour and her relations with the Soviet Union supporting her cause affected Afghan-Pakistan relations, which also had implications in India-Pakistan relations. In addition, the Sino-Pakistan axis against India, which started developing in the early sixties, was extended into a global one by the growing rapprochement between the USA and China in the late sixties and early seventies. This seriously threatened the security of India. As a result, India had been quite friendly with the Soviet Union. Further, the Soviet support to India on the Kashmir problem and to Afghanistan on the Pakhtoonistan issue became a gesture of friendship between India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. This led alienation between Pakistan and India on the one hand and between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other. Consequently, Pakistan developed good relations with China and the United States, creating the security problem for India and thus making India lean more and more to the Soviet Union. So also Afghanistan went to the Soviet side in view of such developments.

In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a frontline state in the US global strategy. After the exit of the Shah of Iran, only Pakistan was strategically so placed and capable of playing the role of the US policeman of the

Persian Gulf. As Professor Stephen Cohen has pointed out, "Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted and whose security related resources are inadequate ... will not go away nor can they be ignored. Pakistan has the capacity to fight, to go nuclear, to influence the global strategic balance (if only by collapsing)." Obviously, Pakistan could serve as an entrepot for the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) to protect Western access to oil. The new contours on the US-Pakistan relations made direct American aid to Afghan rebels possible, keeping Soviet resources and attention engaged in Afghanistan and away from areas of greater interest to the US like Europe, typical of the British policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This new trend developed in the US-Pak relations in the wake of the Soviet intervention which has direct bearing on India. The Indian sub-continent is the strategic division between India and Pakistan. The massive rearming of Pakistan was taken by India with grave concern. These arms have been used only against India. Moreover, the apprehended central role of Pakistan in the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) is likely to adversely affect India's security and development for which Indian ocean is vital. With such apprehensions, India has gone all-out to match the capability of Pakistan by purchasing arms from the Soviet Union, France and other countries and by modernizing its own R & D, incurring the huge amount of the scarce resources which might have otherwise been

utilized for the economic development and upliftment of the poor.

Besides, India's stand vis-a-vis the Soviet presence in Afghanistan created bitterness between India and Pakistan. India's policy of crisis diffusion in dealing with the Afghan problem, as we shall see in the following pages, ended without any concrete outcome. Moreover, the role of the press and other media in Pakistan in giving representation to anti-Indian postures in the context of the Punjab crisis in India further worsened the relations between the two countries. And several armed skirmishes between the armed forces of both the countries over Siachen Glacier have been acting as set-back to the process of normalization between the two countries.

However, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has also made both the countries realize the need of cooperation in various fields. In 1981 General Zia-ul-Haq put forward the proposal of having a No-War or Non-aggression pact with India. In response to this proposal, India proposed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and co-operation in 1982. The former was a limited and a negative concept for India dealing with one aspect of relations, namely, security while the latter was too premature for Pakistan to have. However, the agreement signed on March 10, 1983 to constitute a Joint Commission of India and Pakistan having four sub-commissions including various fields was the hallmark in this respect. There have been three meetings of the commission along with four sub-commissions (1983) (1984) (1985). In addition, the recent flurry of diplomatic efforts embrace the entire gamut of Indo-Pakistan

relations and have yielded certain results, espousing hopes for the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

An attempt has been made to study the strategic importance of Afghanistan in India-Pakistan relations before and after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The main concern of the study is to point out the impact of the Soviet intervention on India-Pakistan relations mainly in strategic and political terms. Drawing upon some of the rich and varied literature on Afghanistan and Indo-Pak relations, various periodicals, and newspapers, etc., it describes and analyses the Afghan problem and its implications regarding India-Pakistan relations.


The scheme of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter I reviews Afghanistan's role in regional and global strategy, her relations with the Soviet Union and the United States and her internal political scenario before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. Chapter II analyses the trends of the Afghan factor in India-Pakistan relations from 1947 till the Soviet intervention. The reactions and repercussions espoused by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,

form the subject of Chapter III. Chapter IV analyses the nature of relations between India and Pakistan till the Soviet intervention. Chapter V is devoted to a discussion of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on India-Pakistan relations. It analyses new regional and global developments brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their implications in

India-pakistan relations; summarizes the recent trends adversely affecting India-pakistan relations, and evaluates the recent diplomatic flurry between the two countries to have good neighbourly relations. Chapter VI discusses the various efforts made by India, Pakistan and the United Nations to resolve the Afghan problem and analyses India-pakistan relations in this context. Lastly, conclusion draws together the summary of the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on Indo-pakistan relations and makes certain suggestions for improving these relations. A select bibliography is indicative of the material consulted for this study.

A F G H A N I S T A N

A STRATEGIC LOCATION



200 0 200 400 K.M

- PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR
- CHINA OCCUPIED KASHMIR
- AREA CEDED TO CHINA BY PAKISTAN

CHAPTER-IAFGHANISTAN - AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
STRATEGY

Afghanistan is strategically very important for the Indian sub-continent. There had always been a close connection between what is historically called India and what today is called Afghanistan.¹ There are references to the rivers of Afghanistan region in the Vedas,² as the Aryans came to India along this route. Apart from the Aryans, the Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians and the Turks, all came to India by crossing the passes in the Hindukush and Sulaiman ranges of mountains.³ Afghanistan had formed the parts of the empires of Persians, the Greeks, the Mauryas,⁴ the Kushans,⁵ the Guptas,⁶ the Turks and Mughals.⁷ In such conditions the safeguarding of Indian frontiers from the side of Afghanistan has always been a prime occupation of the Indian rulers.

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1. H.C. Ray, Dynastic History of Northern India, Vol. I, 1934, p. 70
 2. Rigveda, X. 75
 3. R.I. Malhotra, Afghan Search for Identity, Delhi, 1982, p.1
 4. F.J. Fleet, Epigraphia Indica, Vol. XXXIII, Calcutta, p. 333.
 5. V.A. Smith, The Early History of India, London, 1908, p. 244.
 6. R.C. Majumdar and A.S. Altekar, The Vakatah Gupta Age, p. 168.
 7. V.A. Smith, op.cit., p. 126.

Afghanistan was given a definite shape by Ahmad Shah Abdali⁸ in 1747 by uniting its various autonomous principalities into an organized state.⁹ But modern Afghanistan is the result of the boundary settlements with Imperial Britain and Imperial Russia in the Nineteenth Century. Afghanistan, as a result, came to be regarded as a buffer state.¹⁰ Both Russia and Britain had rivalry over Afghanistan - former 'in search of warm waters' and latter seeking a 'safe and scientific frontier' in the north-west.¹¹ "This circumstance resulted in the creation of the Wakhan corridor - a strip of Afghan territory projecting to the north-east, along the Wakhan Ridge of the Hindukush for almost 200 miles, in places it is only seven miles wide."¹² The narrow valley of Wakhan prolongs the north-eastern frontier as far as Chinese border in the Sarikal range of the Pamirs. From this point, the eastern and southern limits are bounded by Kashmir and Pakistan; the northern boundary with the Asian Republic of the USSR follows the Amu Darya river to Kham-i-Ab, and thence in a general south-westerly direction to Zulfikar where it meets Afghanistan's western boundary with Iran.¹³

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8. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, London, 1951, Vol.II, p. 275.
 9. Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India, Sterling, Delhi 1972, p. 1.
 10. Ibid., p. 276
 11. Ibid., p. v
 12. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1973-74, Vol.I, p. 165.
 13. The Chamber's Encyclopaedia, London, 1967, Vol. I, p. 120.

Thus, location of Afghanistan is of strategic importance not only because it is situated in proximity to Russia in the north and the north-west but to the fact that to the west of Afghanistan lay Iran and to the north-east of it lay Kashmir and Pakistan. Her physical configuration has been such that it constitutes 'formidable natural defences for the country'.¹⁴ However, Afghanistan is accessible to foreigners through a limited number of passes. Most of them on the Russian, Persian and Indian (now Pakistani) side remain intractable in winter. Of these, the Zulfikar pass on the Russian side was regarded by the British Indian Government as the most vulnerable point... because of the threat posed by the Russian expansionism in the nineteenth century. Besides, the high plateau and mountain ranges of the Hindukush provided a formidable line of defence for the British Empire in India. There were, however, dangerous chinks in this defensive armour - the Chitral, the Kurram and the Gomal Valleys, and the Khyber and Khojak - Bolan passes. Since time immemorial these valleys and passes were the invasion routes into northern India.¹⁵

Afghanistan covers an area of 647497 sq. km. Geographically, it is divided into three regions by the great mountain ranges of the Hindukush; (i) a region of plains and

14. Bilgrami, *op.cit.*, p. 2

15. Ibid.

foothills, with gentle slopes towards Amu Darya to the north,
 (ii) a region of high plateau and sandy desert to the South, and
 (iii) a region of lofty mountains and deep and narrow valleys¹⁶
 between the two regions.

Afghanistan is a country of high altitudes. The greater part of Afghanistan is situated at 2000 and 10,000 ft. above the sea level, while other remaining parts are lofty mountains and extensive sandy desert upto the Helmand river and its tributaries.¹⁷

The population of Afghanistan is composed of people of diverse origins. It is natural because it is a country through which throughout the ages vast hordes of invaders made their way into India.¹⁸ The modern states of Afghanistan and Pakistan, inhabited by Pustun and Pathan tribes, have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world. Each horde, as it passed, will have left its mark on the inhabitants of the country, one way of life¹⁹ constantly overlaying another. Thus, its northern part is inhabited by the Uzbeks, the south-eastern part by Ghilzais, and Herat by people of Iranian stock (Tajiks) who are mostly Persian speaking. Kabul, Kandhar, Jalalabad and Ghazni are inhabited by Afghans themselves who account more than half of the population

16. Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit., p. 164.

17. Ibid., p. 165

18. Bilgrami, op.cit., p. 2

19. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, London, 1958, p. 25

20

of the country and enjoy the highest power and prestige. Geographical conditions have reinforced the rugged independence and self-sufficiency of isolated rural communities, often separated from their immediate neighbours by race, sect, language²¹ or tribal differences, and by hereditary feuds.

There are some twenty main languages, and innumerable dialects in Afghanistan. But Pashto and Persian in various forms are the two lingua franca, the mother-tongues of 80 per cent of the population, while Persian is known by most of the non-Pashtuns having a mother tongue of eastern Turkish or other²² origin.

The following table gives a rough estimate of population of Afghanistan based on a variety of sources:

20. Bilgrami, op.cit., p. 2

21. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, London, 1981, p. 10

22. Ibid.

Table 1Population of Afghanistan: Main ethnic groups, 1979

| Group | Approx. number | Location |
|--------------------------|----------------|--|
| Pushtun | 7000000 | concentrated in south and south-east but settled far and wide. |
| Tajiks | 3500000 | north and north-east and Kabul region. |
| Hazaras | 1500000 | centre (Hazarajat) and in Kabul. |
| Uzbeks | 1300000 | north. |
| Aimaq | 800000 | west. |
| Farsiwan (or Heratis) | 600000 | west and south. |
| Turkman | 300000 | north. |
| Brahui | 200000 | south-west. |
| Baluchi | 100000 | west and north-west. |
| Nuristani | 100000 | east. |

Source: Anthony Hyman, op.cit., p. 11

Almost 90 percent Afghan population is rural, either living in villages the whole year, or settling for part of the year. Of the urban population, almost half is concentrated in Kabul. This trend has been accentuated since 1979 by a flood of internal refugees from bombed-out villages too far from the borders to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran.

Afghanistan due to its location, topography and its roughly quadrilateral shape, was deemed somewhat impenetrable and also unavoidable. Sir Herbert Edwards remarked: "Afghanistan must be admitted to be a great physical difficulty. It is difficult to conquer, difficult to hold, difficult to sustain an army in, and most difficult of all to leave."²⁴ Napoleon dreamt of conquering the East through Persia via Afghanistan. Russia, in order to discourage the British in Europe, approached the borders of Afghanistan. The British policy was also determined by the gradual advance of Russia south-wards and partly also by turbulent character of the people of Afghanistan.²⁵ Consequently, the British had to fight three costly wars with Afghanistan to defend British Indian empire.²⁶

The success which the British met in keeping Indian frontier safe and in checking the Russian influence in Afghanistan shows that its geographical character is such that it can be easily influenced by the outside forces if they are powerful enough and willing to do so. Modern Afghanistan is indeed a purely accidental

24. Cited in Bilgrami, op.cit., p. 164.

25. Ibid.

26. The first Afghan war was fought in 1839-42 between England under Lord Auckland and Dost Muhammad, the Afghan ruler. The war proved disastrous for the English. The Second Afghan war (1878-80) was fought under Lord Lytton. The victors were English. By the treaty of Gandamak, Yakub Khan accepted the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. The third Afghan war (1919) was fought between Amanullah and Lord Chelmsford. By the treaty of Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was given freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy.

geographic unit, which has been carved out of the heart of central Asia by the sword of conquerors or the genius of individual statesmen.²⁷"

Politically, Afghanistan has two frontiers of major length: one on the north with the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tadzhik Republics of Soviet Union, the other on the south and east with Pakistan. It shares with the USSR an almost 2,000 mile border with 1.5 million of the Uzbeks and the equally divided Persian speaking Tadzhiks between Afghanistan and the USSR. While with Pakistan, it shares about 12000 kilometres border along with a substantial number of Pathans creating the problem of Pakhtoonistan. The whole controversy runs about the Durand Line drawn in 1893 by the British rulers and Amir Abdur Rahman.

Afghanistan existed as buffer state by the British rulers, and Russia acceded to it as such. Both the British and Russians played a diplomatic role for political gains and tactics they used was that of pressure. They never resorted to any armed conflict as their interests never demanded it. The main object of the British policy was to keep Afghanistan out of Russian influence and within that of British India. Its policy towards Afghanistan was largely shaped by the considerations of Indian defence. Its various facets were 'forward policy', 'policy of

27. Lord Curzon, quoted in C.C. Davies: The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, Cambridge, 1982, p. 153

non-interference in the internal affairs known as 'Masterly Inactivity', attempts to constitute a 'neutral zone' or buffer state' between the British and Russian possessions.²⁸

The object of Russia as widely believed in the western world was to have an access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and 'to put pressure on Afghanistan to gain concessions from the the British in Europe' who had supported the Ottoman Empire. As regards this, an extract from the Moscow Gazette of July 19, 1878 may be cited:²⁹

"The time has arrived for Russia to establish her influence over the whole of Central Asia, and this is all the more easy as the ruler of Afghanistan is not on good terms with England - our foe in Central Asia. The concentration of our influence on the frontiers of the territories of the Empress of India would be natural answer to the English seizure of Cyprus In Asia there are two political powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably come into collision. England wishes to be Russia's nearest neigh-bour in Asia Minor, and it is only natural, therefore, that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English frontiers in India."³⁰

So thwarted in Europe, Russia could seek concessions by putting pressures on Britain through Afghanistan. General Skobeloff of Russia explained: 'the stronger Russia in Central Asia, the weaker England in India, and the more conciliatory she will be

28. Bilgrami, op.Cit., p. x

29. Ibid., p. 185

30. Parl Papers, 1847, LXXX, p. 141, cited in Ibid., p. 185

31
in Europe.'

Consequently, Russia approached the Central Asia, and the more problematic it grew to the British. So, they considered Afghanistan essential to safeguard India from Russian expansionism. There emerged two schools of thought to encounter Russian influence: 32
close Border Policy School, and Forward Policy School.

The close border policy, related with conservatives, meant direct British rule only in the settled areas of the frontier region. The tribes were left to administer their affairs by themselves. It implied non-interference in Afghanistan, 33
friendliness and stability in the country so as to deter Russia.

During the 1890s the close border policy was abandoned in favour of the Forward Policy. It included administering certain tribal areas and creating garrison towards other parts of the region. Amir Abdur Rahman was forced to sign a border agreement which pushed 'the border from the eastern foot of the border hills 34
to their crest' dividing the pathans from the east of the Durand Line.

31. Ibid, p. 131

32. Kaleem Bahadur, Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan, International Studies, New Delhi, J.N.U., October-December, 1980, p. 643.

33. Ibid.

34. James, J., Political problems of a Borderland, T. Embree, ed, Pakistan's Western Borderlands, New Delhi, 1977, p. 11

Lord Curzon created the North West Frontier Province in 1901 and substituted a policy of frontier garrisons drawn from the people themselves for the costly experiment of large forts and isolated posts thrown forward into a turbulent and fanatical country - a policy of military concentration against diffusion³⁵ and of tribal conciliation in place of exasperation.

Treaty of Gundamak signed by the Afghan ruler, Yakub Khan and the British in 1879, ceded several districts of Afghanistan on its eastern frontier to the British and also the control of the Khyber and Michini passes. The British India government got the right to control Afghanistan's external relations and Afghanistan got assurance of support in external relations and also non-interference in its internal affairs. As the British agent was stationed in Kabul, the people got enraged and furious. There was great uprising. Yakub Khan was forced to abdicate. And the treaty³⁶ lay nullified.

Yakub Khan was succeeded by Abdur Rahman. Now the internal conditions in Afghanistan took turn from anarchy to an absolute monarchy with political and administrative stability. Abdur Rahman signed the Durand Agreement in 1893. All tribes living east of the Durand line were recognised as belonging to the British area of influence. "The agreement projected them into the 20th century

35. Kalim Bahadur, op.cit., p. 645.

36. Ibid., p. 644.

because of its arbitrary division of the pashtoon tribes between Afghanistan and what was then British India. The ruling dynasties of Afghanistan have been of pashtoon stock and therefore bitterly resented and resisted what they considered to be an amputation.³⁷

Habibullah was succeeded by Amanullah. He succeeded in seeking independence from the British tutelage, received strength from Communist Russia which recognised Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign state. Amanullah supported the cause of Indian revolutionary revolutionaries, declared war against the British Government in May 1919. This war (third Indo-Afghan war) did not result in the total victory for the British. "The Indo-Afghan Treaties of 1919 and 1921 strengthened the position of Amanullah. Article XI of the 1921 treaty recognised Afghanistan as a bonafide party in so far as the question of tribal areas was concerned. It provided Afghanistan with the legal basis for its claims across the Durand Line."³⁸

Amanullah was overthrown in 1929. Nadir Khan, his successor and Zahir Shah, the successor of Nadir Khan both followed the policy of neutrality towards the tribal areas.

37. Lean, B. Poulla da, Pakhtunistan: Afghanistan's Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan in Embree, ed., No. 1, pp. 124-127.

38. Lye Franck Forotha, Pakhtunistan-Disputed Disposition of Tribal Land, Middle East Journal, Washington, D.C., Vol. 6, p. 54.

The British signed three treaties with Tsarist Russia about Afghanistan. First, in July 1887 at St. Petersburg without the knowledge of Afghanistan on the delimitation of Afghanistan's northern boundary; the second, in 1885 over the Pamir Boundary Agreement; and third, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. The Anglo-Russian rivalry ended as the German empire rose to threaten the balance of power in Europe.

The relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan made a headway in 1921 by the treaty of Friendship concluded between the two countries. The treaty was 'based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference into each other's internal affairs'. It was concluded 'with a view to consolidating friendly relations between Russia and Afghanistan³⁹ and protecting Afghanistan's genuine independence. In terms of Article 10 of the treaty, the Soviet Union agreed 'to render Afghanistan financial and other material assistance'. The Soviet Union provided a gift of one million gold rubles to Afghanistan, several airplanes and 5,000 rifles, the construction of a telegraph line linking Kushka, Herat-Kandahar-Kabul, technical and other experts, and training to Afghan pilots. Many Soviet technicians came to Afghanistan in 1924 into Afghanistan's army and air force when the then king Amanullah Khan organised the⁴⁰ Royal Afghan Air Force.

39. Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1919-1969, Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1971, p. 28.

40. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 27, 1983.

In 1927 an agreement was signed between the USSR and Afghanistan. It envisaged the construction of a series of airfields. Afghanistan started buying Soviet built aircrafts 'manned by Soviet pilots and serviced by Soviet ground crews'.⁴¹ Afghan personnel were sent to the USSR for training as air crew.

In May 1928, King Amanullah visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government. His visit resulted in an agreement on increasing of economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The USSR agreed to send the Soviet Scientists to Afghanistan.

On June 24, 1931, both the countries signed the treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Agression in the accord with the 1921 Treaty. Article 1 of the treaty lays down that 'in the event of war or military hostilities between one of the contracting parties and one or several third countries, the other contracting party pledges to observe neutrality with regard to the first'. They also pledged not to 'tolerate any act on their respective territories which might be detrimental to each one of them'.⁴²

In the next two decades the influence of the Soviet Union diminished. In 1955 Daoud sent his brother to Washington to seek economic assistance including arms. But America declined. So, Daoud went to the Soviet Union for arms and renewed the 1950

41. Ibid.

42. USSR Academy of Sciences, Afghanistan: Past and Present, 1981, pp. 203-204.

43

Transit Agreement for another five years. In 1955 the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan. They⁴⁴ provided support to Afghanistan on Pukhtun areas of Pakistan. Daoud announced a further 10-year extension of the Soviet-Afghan⁴⁵ Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression of 1931.

In August 1956 an agreement was signed between the two countries including \$ 25 million arms agreement. Afghanistan also accepted an invitation to Czechoslovakia to inspect the latest type of military equipments. The Soviet bloc contributed T-34 tanks, MIG interceptors, bombers, helicopters and small arms. The bloc included - Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and⁴⁶ East Germany. The Soviet Union also agreed to build and expand airfields near Mazar-i-Sharif, Shindand, and Begram. Instructors⁴⁷ and spare parts followed the arms deliveries.'

By 1963 the Turkish officers in Afghanistan were replaced by the Russian. All its aircrafts and advisers were provided by the Soviet Union and most of the aircrews of Afghanistan were trained in the USSR. Afghan armed forces in all, were reorganised and modernised with the Soviet military assistance and became

43. Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan, New Delhi, 1980, p. 119

44. Kalim Bahadur, op.cit., p. 650.

45. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p. 119

46. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 27, 1983.

47. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p. 120.

an instrument of Monarchy. They also were now in position to
⁴⁸
 influence the government.

In regard to transport and communication 'the USSR built or assisted in building more than 70% of the Afghan hard surface roads. The two major routes constructed are: the Salang pass road from the river port of Sher Khan (Qizil Quala) on the Amu Darya to Kabul.' This had been for 10 years in operation and 600 Soviet specialists were there; the Turghuncal-Herat-Kandahar highway connecting Pul-i-Khumri with Mazon shortly and Mazhar-i-Sharif with new port of Harratan and Shibarghan on Amu Darya.
⁴⁹
 About 500 Soviet specialists assisted in its construction.

There has also been co-operation in agriculture. The irrigation system was constructed under the Soviet auspices. For instance, Sarde Dam was constructed on the Jilga river with
⁵⁰
 the co-operation and assistance of the USSR.

About seventy industrial projects in Afghanistan have been constructed with Soviet economic and technical assistance. On April 14, 1977, treaty on the Development of Economic co-operation was concluded for 12 years. Article 2 states: that co-operation between the two countries will be developed in 'the gas oil, petro-chemical and chemical industries, agriculture,

48. USSR Academy of Sciences, Afghanistan, Past and Present, Moscow, p. 205.

49. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 27, 1983.

50. USSR Academy of Science, op.cit., p. 208.

irrigation and other spheres of the economy in the public health and veterinary services; geological prospecting for oil, gas and solid minerals and their industrial development; design and construction of power installation; development of transport and communication; vocational training of personnel; environmental⁵¹ protection.

As regards trade, Afghanistan's trade with Russia comprised about 40% of its entire foreign trade in 1911-15. But after the 1917 Revolution in Russia it started again in 1925. The free import of Afghanistan goods were allowed. The USSR lifted the import duty from some commodities. Afghan merchants were given free entry and were permitted to open permanent offices in a number of Soviet cities. In 1950 a treaty of a trade and payments agreement was signed. This was replaced by another trade and payments agreement on March 20, 1974. And on June 18, 1976, a trade agreement was signed for the 1976-80. "The agreement provided for the growth in trade between Afghanistan and the USSR by⁵² about 69% in five years."

In 1976 the Joint Afghan-Soviet Transport-Delivery Society (ASTESD) was organised for the purpose of dealing with transportation⁵³ of export and import and transit cargo through Afghan territory.

The scientific, educational and cultural co-operation upto the late 1950s was of a casual character. Since 1960 it has been

51. Pravda, Moscow, April 15, 1977

52. USSR Academy of Sciences, op.cit., p. 213.

53. Ibid., p. 214-15.

developing on the basis of a treaty on scientific and cultural co-operation. It envisages the joint programme—training of Afghan nation personnel with a higher and secondary technical education. According to the Afghanistan Central Statistical Department, between 1957 and 1974 the Soviet Union helped train more than 60,000 skilled Afghan workers and 5,200 technicians at such projects. There has also been a great deal of co-operation in the field of arts and sports. The co-operation in the field⁵⁴ of public health system has also been making headway.

The Soviet Union undertook constructing or improvement of three of Afghanistan's four international airports including the major airport at Kabul. As part of its 1956 aid agreement, the USSR built the air facilities at Bagram (40 miles north of Kabul) which became the major base for Afghanistan's air force and⁵⁵ included facilities of handling the largest military aircraft.

In addition, various other projects were undertaken with the Soviet help like Shindant air force (1963), the expansion of the facilities and training stations at Mazar-i-Sharif, and the⁵⁶ construction of a bridge across the Amu Darya at Hayratin.

The most epoch making treaty was signed on 5 December 1978 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan (the treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and co-operation between the

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

USSR & IRA). It was based on the principle of 'complete equality, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs'. It was conducted with a view to "reaffirming their commitments to their aims and principles of the Afghan-Soviet treaty of 1921 and 1931 which laid the basis for friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the Afghan and Soviet peoples and which meet their basic national interests." It contributed to safeguarding the security and independence of the two countries. According to Article 4 of the treaty "the high contracting parties acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendliness and good neighbourliness, as well as the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take, by agreement, appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the interests of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to develop co-operation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them."

On May 27, 1979, the two sides exchanged the ratification instruments and the treaty went into force.⁵⁷

The United States and Afghanistan: Afghanistan has ever been neglected by the US. Though Afghanistan tried to maintain the balance in her relations with both the great powers, the US did not pay any attention to Afghanistan because of its geographic

57. The Asian Recorder, 1980, Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 14783

proximity to Pakistan. Given the Pukhtoonistan issue, the US tilted towards Pakistan,—her ally in containing the Soviet expansionism in Asia. It was only in economic terms that the US gave the aid and assistance but rather insufficient. The US aided Helmund Valley Project to be built on the lines of Tennessee Valley Authority, which had floundered in the salty soils of south-western Afghanistan. The Americans had not made adequate preparations for utilization of the impounded waters of the Helmund. It also brought bad name to America because of inadequate⁵⁸ preparations and corrupt implementation of the plan.

In 1955 the United States rejected Afghanistan's demand for assistance including arms and her support for Pakhtoonistan. The US also rejected the request for assistance to build another transit route through Iran to Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf. All this led Afghanistan nearer to the USSR for help, aid and⁵⁹ assistance.

The Americans built an international airport at Kandahar with an amount of \$15 million for the purpose of refuelling the⁶⁰ piston engine aircraft. But with the jets, the need of such engine was no more.

With time, America accepted the position of a junior participant in the economic development of Afghanistan and even came to tie up some of its projects with those of the Soviet⁶¹ Union and East European countries.

58. Kuldeep Nayar, op.cit., p. 118.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

The way the two super-powers co-ordinated their work was amazing. The Soviets built roads in the north, the Americans in the South, and the two got together to join roads at given points. Moscow prepared maps of the northern one third of Afghanistan, Washington of the Southern two thirds. The Russians built the Kabul airport, the Americans installed electrical and communications equipment for it. Indeed, the Russians and the Americans even established an international club, open to all foreigners except Chinese in Afghanistan.

The US-Afghan relations despite having their manifestation in economic and trade have, however, been not politically prudent and militarily helpful for Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, was thus a logical imperative of this neglect by the US and the culmination of the Soviet aid and assistance in political, military and economic matters.

Thus Afghanistan was given low priority by the United States of America in comparison to Pakistan. Pakistan began to get supply of arms from the US under the US policy of containing the Soviet Union after world war II. Both India and Pakistan were approached for an alliance to strengthen the free world against communist aggression. India declined to be a party of such alliance while Pakistan accepted US arms and became a member of the Baghdad pact that linked Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, while totally ignoring Afghanistan.

The US role was deliberately limited, principally by Washington's concern over an adverse reaction by Pakistan whose leaders strongly objected to Kabul's claims to the North West Frontier on the basis of a 'pushtunistan' that would regroup all Pathans on both sides of the Durand Line. Largely for this reason, Dulles declined in 1954 to extend military aid to Kabul, and the United States limited itself to an economic aid program⁶³ directed essentially at the southern half of Afghanistan. While Pakistan was provided with modern weapons and aid from the USA, Afghan requests to the USA for military supplies to renovate its armed forces met with repeated refusals, except under unacceptable⁶⁴ conditions. Here too the Soviet Union moved in, to become supplier to the Afghan armed forces, which has already been discussed. This led Afghanistan to lean more and more to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Also the Soviet Union diplomatically supported Afghanistan as regards its stand over Pakhtoonistan issue. After Saur Revolution 1978, Afghanistan further came under the influence of the Soviet Union. This led President of Pakistan Gen. Ziaul Haq warn Washington that the balance of power had seriously tilted Moscow's favor, but this⁶⁵ warning had little or no effect on the USA. So, the Soviet

63. Amaury de Riencourt, India and Pakistan, Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Winter 1982/83, p. 424.

64. Anthony Hyman, op.cit., pp. 28-29.

65. Amaury de Riencourt, op.cit., p. 424

military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 was the logical outcome of the constantly increasing Soviet-Afghan relations and the continuous neglect of Afghanistan by the USA.

The Growth and Development of Communism in Afghanistan: The communist movement in Afghanistan started in the 50s. But its seeds can be seen sprouted around 1920. Mahmud Tarzi, an enlightened Muslim and a writer, who commanded considerable readership from Turkey to Central Asia, returned to Kabul from exile. His paper, Seraj-ul-Akhbar (Torch of Press) was a guide for a group of young Afghans who called themselves the mashruta (constitutionalists). Amanullah, who became Afghanistan's king (1919-29) and who married Tarzi's daughter, Soraya, was one of them. They were like western liberals. They read only European political literature, but neither Russian nor British'.⁶⁶

The fall of king Amanullah resulted in political inertia. The monarchy sustained by an obsolete coalition of tribal chiefs, feudal nobility, and clergy. The economic conditions became worse. The five percent of the landowners owned 45% of the cultivable land. Educationally, people were almost backward. Even in 1977⁶⁷ the rate of illiteracy was 90% for men and 98% for women.

66. Kuldeep Nayar, op.cit., p. 98

67. M.S. Agwani, The Saur Revolution and After, International Studies, New Delhi, October-December 1980, p. 558.

The establishment of the Bank-i-Millie Afghan (Afghanistan national Bank) ushered an era of commercial and economic activity. By the mid 1970 - the number of the modern industry employees was only 27,000 people out of the total⁶⁸ working population of about 4 million.

In 1947, some radical educated youths formed Wikh-e-Zalmayan or Awakened Youth. Taraki was a member of this group and in 1949 he assumed its leadership. He also came out with a bi-weekly, Angar (Embers) in both Dari and Pushtu. Fifty left oriented persons were also elected to the 120 member parliament in 1949. This was the first Afghan experience of⁶⁹ 'Liberal parliamentarism, with relatively free elections'. But this experiment was scuttled before the 1952 election.

Several newspapers came in opposition to the Government. Watan (Homeland) and Nada-i-Khalq (voice of the people), were the two important newspapers both published in Dari. They⁷⁰ influenced the university students.

These developments were scuttled by conservatives. In 1952, the leaders were arrested and the newspapers were closed down. In 1953 Daoud imposed himself as the Prime Minister. He had no use of parliament and with an iron hand he ruled⁷¹ Afghanistan for 10 years.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

Daoud resigned in 1963. Again the demand for liberal parliament was revived. So, another experiment in this regard was made in 1963. The Loya Jirga passed a new constitution declaring Afghanistan to be a 'constitutional monarchy. Islam was to be the religion of Afghanistan. There was provision for a two house parliament: Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) with fully elected 210 members, and Mishrano Jirga (House of Nobles) with 84 members, 60 elected and 24 nominated.⁷²

On January 1, 1965 a political party, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded by Noor Mohammad Taraki who became its General Secretary. Its central committee also included Babrak Karmal and Amin.⁷³

In 1965 and 1969 elections were held. But the constitutional position was held in abeyance. Half-hearted advance towards monarchy failed to satisfy the rising political inspiration of the people.⁷⁴

The Press Law was passed in 1965. This liberalised the publication of newspapers. Taraki started 'Khalq' advocating not more than land reforms and public ownership of certain types of property. The conservative elements were frowned up and in May 1966 the paper was banned.⁷⁵

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 559

74. Ibid., p. 558

75. Ibid., p. 559

In 1966 Babrak Karmal broke away from the party and formed a new party, Parcham. The Khalq got split into two: parcham (Flag) led by Babrak Karmal in March 1968, and Shula-e-Javed (eternal flame) by Dr Rahim Mahmudi (Pro-Beijing). Another fraction of 'Parcham' came, Sitam-e-Milli (Afghan national oppression) led by Tahir Badakhshah (outright maoist). The Khalq and Parcham were pro-Moscow. However, all the papers⁷⁶ were banned in 1969.

In July 1977 both the Khalq and Parcham became united due to the efforts made by the Soviet Union and Communist party of India (CPI) in New Delhi. They formed Jamiyat-e-democratiqi-e-Khalq (PPDA),⁷⁷ to oppose Daoud's tyranny who came by a bloodless coup of July 17, 1973 by ousting King Zahir Shah replacing monarchy by republic. Daoud was also overthrown on 27 April 1978 by Noor Mohammad Taraki. Taraki was also overthrown by Hafizullah Amin in September 1979. And on 27 December 1979, Amin also fell prey to another coup led by Babrak Karmal in the wake of which the Soviet military intervention took place in Afghanistan.

76. Ibid.

77. Rajendra Sareen, Afghan PM Sacks Top Parcham Leaders, The Times of India, New Delhi, December 4, 1978

CHAPTER-IIAFGHANISTAN: A FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

As already discussed, Afghanistan has strategically been very important for India. It had also formed a cultural province of India. Abul Fazal described Kabul and Kandhar as 'twin gates of Hindustan'.¹ In the British period Afghanistan acted as a buffer between the British India and the Czarist Russia. The British Indian Government tried to maintain friendly relations with the Afghan rulers, while India provided markets for Afghan consumer goods. The interests of both the countries, thus, have been complementary.

India's independence resulted in the division of the Indian sub-continent into two states - India and Pakistan. The atmosphere of the relations between the two countries has been full of mutual distrust and suspicion. The principles of the geographic contiguity and wishes of the people concerned were abandoned in favour of the princes to accede to either of the two dominions or to remain independent.² So, the problem of Kashmir emerged between India and Pakistan - a major set-back to the

1. Cited in Vincent A. Smith, Oxford History of India, Oxford University Press, London, 1923, pp. 674-78.

2. K. Surahmanyam, Indian Security Perspective, ABC Publications, New Delhi, 1982, p. 157.

development of good neighbourly relations between the two countries.

After the birth of Pakistan, the Pakhtoonistan—a corollary of the Durand line has plagued the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakhtoonistan, an area of 19,000 sq. miles extending from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the South, is composed of Pathan and Baluchi tribes. Afghanistan justifies its claims on the ground that these areas have been component parts of Afghanistan state and ethnically closer to the people of Afghanistan. The Durand Line was not regarded by them as *sine qua non*. So, the demand for Pakhtoonistan challenged the very sanctity of the Durand Line. They also demanded from Pakistan free access to the sea via Karachi and a guarantee of mutual neutrality in case of attack on the either party.

According to Pakistan the Durand Line, despite its geographic and ethnic absurdity, constitutes an internationally recognised frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Treaty of 1893, according to Pakistan's interpretation, was not imposed upon Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman but signed after a "cordial discussion." between Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand and all the succeeding rulers of Afghanistan had considered it binding upon Afghanistan. Pakistan being the successor state

3. Kalim Bahadur, Pakistan's Policy towards Afghanistan, International Studies, J.N.U., New Delhi, October-December 1980, p. 646.

has assumed obligations and rights under the various treaties concluded between British India and Afghanistan.⁴ But Afghanistan considers Pakistan not a successor but a new state carved out of British India. Moreover, in the eyes of Pakistan the Pathans have never been a nation and it is not necessary that the people speaking a common language should be in one state.

Consequently, the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been conflict-ridden from the very inception. While opposing Pakistan's membership of the UN in September 1947, Hosayn Aziz, the representative of Afghanistan, stated in the UN General Assembly: "we cannot recognise the North-West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of North-West Frontier have not been given an opportunity, free from any kind of influence, to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Pakistan."⁵

Pakistan, on the other hand, refused to consider the issue. Mohammad Ali Jinnah assured the people of NWFP the equality of status and autonomy within the framework of Pakistan State.

Pakistan, following the British, adopted the close Border Policy in the frontier areas. It drew army from South and North Waziristan and spared no effort to suppress all those who might

4. Ibid.

5. General Assembly Official Records (GAOR) plied, mtg. 92 30 September 1947, p .313.

help Afghan cause. The prominent leaders like the Fakir of Ipi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Abdur Samad Khan Achkzai were dealt with an iron hand. When Fakir became more intractable in South Waziristan, Pakistan used airforce to silence them.⁶

In June 1949, Afghanistan repudiated the treaties concluded with Britain regarding the tribal territories and disowned the Durand Line. Attempts were made to bring about a rapprochement under the pressure of outside events. However, the American Secretary of State, Mr John Foster Dulles began constructing military alliances in Asia, and Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO while Afghanistan and India declined to join the American schemes and followed the policy of non-alignment between the two blocs.

In 1955 the Soviet leaders, Khurshev and Bulganin, visited Afghanistan and declared their country's support to Afghanistan on the Pakhtoonistan issue. In the same year, Pakistan decided to turn all four province into one unit. The scheme was vehemently criticised by Afghanistan. But on October 13, 1955, Pakistan implemented this scheme.⁷

On March 6, 1956, the SEATO meeting held at Karachi lent its support to Pakistan on Pakhtoonistan issue and the Durand Line.⁸

6. Kalim Bahadur, op.cit., p. 649

7. Ibid.

8. The Dawn, Karachi, May 8, 1955.

The diplomatic relations between the two countries were ruptured in 1961. Pakistan blocked the Afghan transit trade through Khyber Pass and Karachi.⁹

For the first time, during the Prime Ministership of Z.A. Bhutto, elected governments were installed in the four provinces of Pakistan. He allowed the formation of popular governments in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, although parties other than his own had won the larger number of seats in the election held in 1970 to the assemblies in those two provinces. Atauliah Khan Mengal of the National Awami Party (NAP) became the Chief Minister of Baluchistan. Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo of the same party became the Governor of the province. In the North West Frontier Province Jamiat-ul-Ulma-i-Islami (Hazarvi) and the NAP formed a coalition government under Mufti Mahmood. However, they were dismissed just two months before the constitution of 1973. The official media related the dismissals of the provincial Governments with the NAP's stated intention of carving out autonomous Pathan and Baluchi areas within Pakistan.

Bhutto's Government had not reconciled itself to those two NAP Governments. It feared that the NAP leadership would join up with Afghanistan and fan Pakhtun and Baluchi nationalism and secure the secession of those provinces. The dismissal of

9. Kalim Bahadur, op.cit., p. 652.

the Atauliah Mengal Government in Baluchistan amounted to an undeclared war on the Baluchis. The Government launched one of the bloodiest campaigns against the Baluchis with the help of army and the airforce. The campaign lasted till the overthrow of Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Thousands of Baluchis were killed and many more forced to take refuge in the mountains and¹⁰ in neighbouring Afghanistan. In the North-West Frontier province, the NAP was banned in 1975 on the charge of treason. And most of its top leaders, along with the Baluchi leaders of the NAP, were put on trial before the specially established Hyderabad tribunals.

The coup of July 1973 by Daoud Khan in Afghanistan was welcomed in the Baluchi areas. Daoud gave support to the demand for pakhtoonistan. Afghanistan also raised this issue in the UN General Assembly. In such conditions, Bhutto took strong measures against the Pakhtoons and Baluchis. Afghanistan-pakistan relations became tense but conflagration was averted through the mediation¹¹ of the Shah of Iran.

Bhutto paid a visit to Afghanistan in June 1976 to discuss pakhtoonistan issue. But neither party gave up their stand. However, they agreed to solve their mutual problems on the basis¹² of five principles of peaceful co-existence.

10. Far Eastern Economic Review, London, May 28, 1976

11. The Hindu, Madras, December 2, 1975.

12. The Dawn, Karachi, June 12, 1976

After the Saur Revolution, Afghan rebels started crossing over to Pakistan as refugees. The right wing elements in Pakistan¹³ provided material and moral support to them.

General Zia suddenly visited Kabul in September 1978 to resolve the issue. The Taraki-Zia talks failed. Afghanistan insisted to look the Baluchi and Pakhtoon areas in the light of¹⁴ their historic facts.

The rebel groups of Afghanistan after the Saur Revolution 1978 were being given training in Pakistani territory. These groups had been organised chiefly by the Hizb. Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami monarchist parties. Both were ideologically close to the Jamiat-i-Islami of Pakistan. The headquarters of both¹⁵ the parties were in Peshwar, now a country for contraband arms.

Some religious figures emerged as leaders of Pakistan-based rebel movements. Sayyid Ahmad Gaylani, Sibghatullah Majuiddidi and Ustad Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar were some of the prominent figures. Sayyid Ahmad Gaylani claiming descent from Prophet's family, organised Ittihad-e-Inquilabe Islamiwa-Milli-e Afghanistan or Islamic National Revolutionary Union of Afghanistan. He had his personal grievances as he had lost his land and property in the Saur Revolution (1978). Sibghatullah Majuiddidi came to head

13. Feroz Ahmed, Inqilab Afghanistan, Karachi, 1979, p. 57

14. The Dawn, Karachi, November 21, 1978.

15. International Herald Tribune, London, February 7, 1979

Jabho-e-Nijat-e-Milli or National Liberation front. Ustad Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar headed the fundamentalist outfits Jamiyyat-e-Islamic Association and Hizb-e-Islami or Islamic Party.¹⁶

After the takeover by Hafizullah Amin in 1979, some partisan policies and measures were adopted in Afghanistan. This alienated a large number of Afghan people. The number of Afghan refugees continued to swell in the Pakistan territory¹⁷ and these refugees turned into rebel forces, helped both morally and materially by the US, China, Pakistan and Arab countries. After the Soviet intervention on December 27, 1979, heralded a new era in these events. The number of the refugees went larger and larger and support for them by Pakistan and others became more open, clear, and enormous.

India and the Pakhtoonistan Issue: India could not extend her support to the Pakhtoonistan issue in favour of the either country. There was a feeling in the government circles that if India supported the Afghan demand for self-determination in Pakhtoonistan she herself may have to yield to the application of the same principle in Kashmir. Similarly, as the Afghan government was insisting on the application of the principle of self-determination to the Pakhtoon areas, she could not support the

16. M.S. Agwani, The Saur Revolution and After, International Studies, J.N.U., New Delhi, October-December 1980, p. 564

17. Kalim Bahadur, op.cit.

18

Indian stand over Kashmir.

India sympathised with the Pakhtoonistan movement more openly whenever its relations with Pakistan worsened. But had New Delhi really helped the Pathans, Ghaffar Khan would not have said: "You left us to jackals; you promised to help us but you betrayed us." In New Delhi, in 1969, he also said: "India was never serious about Azad Pushtoonistan but used the slogan only as a stick to beat Pakistan with."¹⁹

However, there came a change in India's position over Pakhtoonistan after 1961. Mr Dinesh Singh, the then Deputy Minister of External Affairs, announced full support for the legitimate aspiration of the Pakhtoon people.²⁰ In the United Nations, the Indian delegate asked Pakistan to arrive at just and honourable solution of Pakhtoonistan dispute. Such a move of India led a spokesman of the Afghan Foreign Ministry to say: "Since unfortunately India does not consider the right of self-determination application to the people of Kashmir, it considers that people of Pakhtoonistan should not be deprived of this right." The matter was further clarified by the Indian Government's full support to the cause of Pakhtoonistan.²¹

18. H.A.S. Jafri, Indo-Afghan Relations, New Delhi 1947-67, p. 27.

19. Quoted in Kuldeep Nayar, op.cit., pp. 122-123.

20. Lok Sabha Debates, New Delhi, Vol. 48, November 18 to December 1, 1985

21. The Kabul Times, Kabul, October 9, 1965.

The Government of India, however, accepted in toto the legality of the Durand Line (1893) to the much annoyance of
 22
 Afghanistan.

India-pakistan relations have always been worsening over Kashmir issue. The instrument of accession, which was signed by Kashmir on October 25, 1947, was not accepted by Pakistan. Both the countries resorted to war in 1947 and Pakistan was left holding a part of the state by the UN sponsored cease-fire.

India had promised to hold plebiscite in Kashmir. But prior to plebiscite Pakistan was to vacate the occupied area. India waited till 1953. But instead of vacating, Pakistan brought cold war into the sub-continent by getting the US arms aid and by joining the Baghdad pact, later known as CENTO. The psychological atmosphere between the two countries continued to worsen. Now, the question was not of the demilitarisation of Kashmir but one of militarisation thereof. The Pakistani leadership adopted tougher view. Sardar Abdur Rahim, the President of the Muslim League, stated on November 26, 1956 "we are prepared to sign defence pacts both offensive and defensive with any country which
 23
 is prepared to help us against our one enemy, India. On August 20, 1965 then foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr Z.A. Bhutto asserted: "It is foolish and hypothetical to say that Pakistan has committed

22. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 12, 1963.

23. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, November 27, 1956.

aggression in Kashmir. How can Pakistan commit aggression against her own people." Bhutto in 1961 went to Moscow and suggested that Pakistan was wishing to come out of SEATO and CENTO if the Soviet Union would help Pakistan get Kashmir. But the Soviet Union declined to accept such proposal. Again in 1963, remarking on India's offer of No War Pact to Pakistan, Mr Z.A. Bhutto, the then Minister for Fuel Power and Resources said, "let India arrive at an equal and honourable settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir, we can then have not one but a thousand no war pacts."

On the issue of Kashmir, Afghanistan has lent its support to India. The permanent representative of Afghanistan at the United Nations stated in 1962: "in the case of Kashmir, Pakistan claims that the people of Kashmir have the right of self-determination, despite the declaration by the Kashmiris to be part of India." This shows that in the perception of Afghanistan, the problems of Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan, though the product of the same time and circumstances, were to be dealt with differently.

Thus, Afghanistan has been an important factor in India-Pakistan relations. The Pakhtoonistan issue has adversely affected not only relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan but

24. Ibid., August 21, 1965

25. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p. 69

26. Quoted by P.V. Narsimha Rao in Parliament in response to Pakistan's offer of 'No War Pact' in 1981; The Asian Recorder, New Delhi, December 24-31, 1982, Vol. XXVII, No. 52, p. 16378.

27. Afghanistan News (Kabul), Vol. 5, No. 55, March 1962, p. 9

also between India and Pakistan on account of India's stand vis-a-vis Pakhtoonistan. Also the Kashmir issue has been a stumbling block in the confidence building measures between India and Pakistan. Simultaneously, it has also created bitterness between Pakistan and Afghanistan due to Afghanistan's stand vis-a-vis Kashmir. Immediately after 1947, India was accused by Pakistan of supporting the uprisings in the tribal areas of the NWFP. Jawaharlal Nehru clarified India's position with the
28
following statement:

"May I say in this connection that because of the great tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan over various matters, we are continuously being charged with having secret intrigues with Afghanistan and bringing pressure upon her to adopt a policy in regard to Pakistan which she might not otherwise have done? That, of course, I regret to say, is one of the numerous things without foundation which emanate from Pakistan."

When Pakistan integrated the proposed Pakhtoonistan areas into Pakistan in 1955, the diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were ruptured. India calmly saw the scene but again India was blamed. This was strongly repudiated by India. The Deputy Prime Minister for External Affairs, Mr Ashok Chandra maintained: "India has not interfered in any way in the internal affairs of Afghanistan or in its relations and controversies²⁹ with Pakistan and any statement to the contrary is wholly false."

28. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Publications Division, New Delhi, No. 28, p. 289.

29. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. II (1955), 19-24, December, Cols. 3123-24.

India did not deem it proper to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan over political issues which might have created an irritation between the relations of the two countries.

The attitude of Afghanistan towards India-Pakistan relations has been of neutrality, while slightly inclining in favour of India. In 1965 over Kutch war, Afghanistan remained neutral and its delegate to the United Nations expressed unhappiness about the events and desired not to approve any policy "which is not aimed, before all else, at the maintenance³⁰ of peace and security in a region to which she belongs." In view of such perceptions, Afghanistan welcomed the Tashkent Declaration and expressed the hope that "favourable and just solutions will³¹ be found to all disputes between India and Pakistan."

Afghanistan's attitude towards the liberation of Goa was considerably favourable to India. The Afghan Prime Minister called it "Just actions undertaken with a view to reinstating the³² inherent right of freedom to the people of Goa." In these times, Afghanistan's demand for Pakhtoonistan's autonomy was being held high, Pakistan was called "a great colonial base in this part of the world", constantly using American supplied planes and weapons

30. UNGAOR, 20 session, 1362 Plenary Meeting, October 14, 1965, pp. 4-5.

31. The Kabul Times, Kabul, October 11, 1966.

32. Text of the Afghan Prime Minister's message in Afghanistan News, Kabul, Vol. 5, No. 54, February 1962, p. 2

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suppressing the people of Pakhtoonistan.

In 1959 President of Pakistan Ayub Khan had offered Nehru ³⁴ a Joint Defence Scheme. Nehru rejected it by asking "against whom?" and suggested to have a no war pact with Pakistan which Pakistan did not accept. This inevitably resulted in the mutual confidence building between India and Afghanistan.

As regards Pakistan's plan to enter into the US sponsored alliances, the views of India and Afghanistan have been the same. When in 1954 Pakistan concluded military agreement with the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Sardar Daoud described the US military aid to Pakistan as a grave danger to the security and peace of Afghanistan. Similarly, the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru stated in Parliament: "obviously if military aid comes to Pakistan from the USA, it upsets all kinds of balances, the present existing equilibrium and all that."

Afghanistan remained aloof from the idea of a Pan-Islamic confederation coined in 1947. It dismissed the idea by saying ³⁵ that it would never support such a move. For Afghanistan such a move was neither necessary nor expedient over Pakhtoonistan, as

33. New York Times, December 27, 1961

34. The Dawn, Karachi, October 22, 1959.

35. B.S.N. Murti, Nehru's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1953, p. 93.

she was notable to have support from these countries at the cost of Pakistan. Also, Iran and Pakistan were the parts of western alliance system.

At the time of 1971 Indo-pak war over Bangladesh liberation, Afghanistan kept itself strictly neutral. It recognised Bangladesh quite sometime late. For this generosity, Bhutto visited Kabul on January 11, 1972 and expressed gratitude "for not increasing our problems when we were facing our gravest crisis."³⁶

Afghanistan also welcomed the Simla Agreement concluded between India and Pakistan in 1974. King Zahir Shah spoke to the Indian President on July 10, 1972: "I trust and sincerely hope we are now on the threshold of an era of peace and constructive activity which will bring benefits to all peoples in the area."³⁷

The emergence of Daoud 1973 saw a tough period in Pak-Afghan relations. He advocated strong bond of friendship with India and Bangladesh. He reiterated the policy of non-alignment in the international affairs. The Pakhtoonistan issue was regarded by him the "national issue of great importance."³⁸

36. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 12, 1972.

37. The Statesman, New Delhi, July 11, 1972.

38. The Dawn, Karachi, October 6, 1974.

After the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan (1978), the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan became more worsened. The reforms of Taraki Government and the communist nature of his regime compelled many Afghans to leave the country and to take refuge in Pakistan. As the intensity of the reforms increased in Afghanistan, the number of the Afghan refugees swelled in large quantities. The rebel movements started with the repressive measures - adopted by Amin. The Soviet intervention and the installation of Babrak Karmal in December 1979 further aggravated the situation. The rebel activities enormously increased. Their cause was both morally and materially supported by the Islamic countries, the United States, China and Pakistan.

India asked the Government of Afghanistan to solve the internal problems peacefully within its own sphere. Morarji Desai, while on the visit to Moscow on June 11, 1979, emphasised that the Government of Afghanistan should try to acquire credibility among the Afghan people instead of blaming Pakistan for its troubles.³⁹ India had also raised the question of the outside support to Afghan rebels at the non-aligned countries meet in Sri Lanka (1979) but in rather vague terms. Morarji Desai suggested the Government of Afghanistan to be slow in

39. The Times of India, New Delhi, June 12, 1979

reforms. On January 12, 1980 Zia expressed the view that the Soviet Union might have acted at the request of the Afghan Government, but "the flight of 430,000 refugees into Pakistan⁴⁰ showed the reaction of the Afghan people."

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan caused about 400,000 Afghan refugees to cross over to Pakistan with nearly one-half of them reported to be armed. It had direct bearing on India-Pakistan relations. India's stand vis-a-vis development in Afghanistan brought a set back to the confidence building measures between India and Pakistan. The intervention turned Pakistan into a front line state in the US global strategy and thus brought the more and more super power presence in the Indian sub-continent. It also led to massive rearming of Pakistan which has caused threat to India's security and thus introduced new arms race, both qualitative and quantitative including nuclear one serving drains on the scarce resources of both countries which might have successfully been used to the task of economic development and raising the standard of living of the people of both countries. Further, the intervention also intensified mutual distrust and suspicion between India and Pakistan. To this may also be added regional tensions and global repercussions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as it

40. The Hindu, Madras, January 13, 1980.

brought such intensification to the second cold war of which focal point is the developing world. The intervention led to the increased US and Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean which is vital for India's trade and security . It also led to the US campaign to establish an anti-Soviet strategic consensus which has affected entire international including regional environment affecting India-Pakistan relations ultimately.

CHAPTER-IIITHE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN:REACTIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS

On December 27, 1979, the Soviet troops intervened in Afghanistan to save the new Marxist regime from being toppled. The entry of the Soviet troops is held to be based on the request of the Government of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union for immediate assistance and support in the struggle against external aggression as the imperialist interference in Afghanistan had assumed the scope and form that jeopardized the very existence of the Republic, the Central Committee of the PDPA, and the Government of the DRA.¹ These developments which took place during 1978 and 1979 invoked Article 4 of the Soviet Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourbness and co-operation (1978). The Soviet Union granted the request of the Government of Afghanistan under it. Further, the request of the Afghan Government for military assistance was in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognizes the inherent right² of states for individual or collective self-defence.

However, the Soviet Union's presentation of its justification was tardy and her arguments were also self-

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1. A. Petrov, Pravda, Moscow, December 31, 1979.
 2. K.P. Saksena, Afghanistan Conflict and the United Nations, International Studies, New Delhi, October-December 1980, p. 668

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 contradictory. The key questions like, who was responsible for sending an invitation to foreign troops to move into Afghanistan?, or on what date was this invitation extended?, were not responded by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the Afghan Government in categorical terms. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Mohammad Dost stated that the Soviet armed forces were there in response to the request made by the late President Noor Mohammed Taraki in December 1978 and repeated during President Hafizullah Amin's rule. When the oppression of the Amin regime reached its heights, the Afghan National Army rose in revolt on December 27, 1979 and overthrew his Fascist regime and the new Government with Babrak Karmal, who was present in Afghanistan, directed the whole operation.³

The credibility of such statements is doubted. If President Amin had long been playing into the hands of American imperialism and anti-people reactionary elements, as stated by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Mohammad Dost,⁴ why should he invite Soviet military intervention to overthrow him and then execute him summarily.⁵

Whatever the reality behind the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, its basic aim was to prop up and to save the new Marxist Socialist regime from being toppled and being replaced

3. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 12, 1980.

4. K.P. Saksena, op.cit., p. 669

5. Ibid.

by an anti-Soviet regime. It was not in the interest of the Soviet Union at a time when the regime of Shah in Iran was replaced by the fundamentalist Khomeini regime (1979). And Bhutto was replaced by General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan (1977) and he sought to legitimatise his military regime through the process of Islamization. To this may also be added various fundamentalist movements occurring in many parts of the Islamic world. Such a fundamentalist urge might have created repercussions in the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. The people of these republics are very conscious of their Islamic culture and identity. Also, the rate of population growth of these people is much higher than that of the White Russians who hold key posts in the Government. Consequently, White Russians fear themselves to be outnumbered by Central Asians. The unfriendly regime in Afghanistan along with Pakistan and Iran might have created some internal turmoil in the USSR to the detriment of the image of the Soviet Union as the Super-Power. This feeling might also have prompted the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan to protect it⁶ "teetering on the edge of collapse".

Besides, geopolitical and geo-strategic implications could also be traced behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A Soviet analyst A. Petrov wrote: "Cracks appeared on the notorious strategic arch that Americans have been building for decades

6. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome, How to Live with Soviet Power, 1980, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, p. 1

close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union and in order to mend the crack,⁷ they have sought to bring under their control the Afghan people.

The great security concern for Moscow was posed by the Chinese activities on the Afghan borders. The danger to the Soviet Union would have come on and after the sinification of Sinkiang which has been going on since 1949. According to an authority on Sinkiang, while in 1949 the Han Chinese were only 6% of the population, by 1973 they constituted 35% of the population and numbered 3.5 million out of a total population of 10 million.⁸ This means that the Han Chinese reduced all nationalities in the region to a minority status except vighurs who numbered 5.1 million or 51 percent in 1973. Morris Rossabi has explained that emigration of Han Chinese to Sinkiang is hoped to win minorities over through assimilation.⁹

The Chinese activities affected the long term Soviet calculation. For the Russians the overriding consideration was that earlier in 1979 China had already tried to set up a

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7. On events in Afghanistan, Pravda, Moscow, December 31, 1979, p.
 8. Donal H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Sinkiang, 1949-77, p. 8.
 9. Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, from 1368 to the Present Day, p. 278.

Muslim Republic of Pamir on the Afghanistan territory of Badakhsan and the Wakhan corridor. This republic would have adjoined Sinkiang and Pakistan held territory of Kashmir. This attempt was foiled due to the vigilance of the Afghans and the Russians, but the graver implication of the failed bid were not¹⁰ forgotten.

According to Sir Olaf Caroe "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan was to a large degree prompted by a sense in Moscow that Chinese action in Sinkiang and Tibet were moves to encircle¹¹ Russia." The Soviet Intervention took place at a time when the Soviet Union perceived herself being encircled by NATO in Europe in a decision taken on December 4, 1979 to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe. Further, the deployment of R.D.F. (Rapid Deployment Force) with a thrust against the Southern borders of USSR along the Persian Gulf region stimulated the Soviet Union to intervene in the region.

The United States of America was confronted with the Hostage problem in Iran. The New Cold War had started. Its focal point, in the words of Carter, was "the area running from the middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia." The

10. Dev Murarka: Afghanistan, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1982, p. 21.

11. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Russian View of Afghanistan, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1982, p. 33.

storm centre of this new cold war is West and South West Asia. Though Europe figures at the top of the list of the security concerns of both super-powers and Eastern and Western Europe are undergoing significant changes in perceptions and postures yet the super-power game in Europe is subject to certain ground¹² rules. "In the new Cold war, China, Japan and even the western European allies are very lukewarm, leaving it to be pursued¹³ entirely by the two Super Powers."

On September 26, 1979, Saunders, Harold H., Assistant Secretary for North Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated before the Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that "direct interference in Afghanistan by any country, including the Soviet Union, would threaten the integrity of that nation and the peace in the area¹⁴ and would be a matter of deep concern to the United States."

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to the proclamation of Carter doctrine. The core of the Carter doctrine was a 50 word declaration: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an

12. K. Subrahmanyam, op.cit., p. 11

13. K. Subrahmanyam, The Second Cold War, A.B.C. Publications, New Delhi, 1982, p. 11.

14. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 27, 1979.

assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and it will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force." In his message to the Congress, President Carter spelt out five specific parts of the doctrine: (1) the Rapid Deployment Force that was being quickly assembled (2) enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean and acquisition of base facilities in the Gulf and north-east African littoral; (3) a commitment to the defence of Pakistan and transfer of significant quantities of arms and dollars to that country; (4) strong military and political ties with other countries in the region; and (5) a collective security framework for the region under US auspices. Carter offered this doctrine with the label¹⁵ "A Framework of Regional Cooperation, and thus claimed for the United States the right to intervene in Arabian-Persian Gulf - South West Asian region to defend world capitalist interests. And thus presence of the super-powers began to increase in the Indian Ocean.

In February 1980, the New York Times reported that the Soviets, without reducing the large force stationed in Eastern Europe, had trippled the size of their forces in the Far East. They were developing naval and other capabilities that should permit them to operate simultaneously in the several parts of the world. While Times analysis maintained the US had decided to move a fully equipped army division of 15000 men to the Persian

15. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 6, 1980.

Gulf; with the Rapid Deployment Force in full shape. To keep a permanent naval presence in the Indian ocean, the size of the American fleet was also proposed¹⁶ in increase.

After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the US President, Carter expressed his opinion that "my opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week than in the previous 2½ years before that." He called the intervention an invasion - "a deliberate effort by a powerful atheist government to subjugate an independent Islamic people." He warned the Soviet Union of serious consequences for the Soviet-US relations.¹⁷

On December 30, 1979 President's adviser on National Security Affairs Mr Zbigniew Brezinski called the intervention "a qualitative new step involving direct invasion of a country outside the Warsaw Pact through the use of Soviet armed forces. It was an attempt to impose the Soviet will on an independent country."¹⁸ He also wished to have consultations with Western allies, Pakistan, China, Japan etc.

The United States sought to provide Pakistan with arms and economic aid under the commitment it had made to Pakistan in 1959 that if any aggression was committed against it, the US would take

16. New York Times, New York, February 2, 1980 and June 1, 1980.

17. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 6, 1980

18. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 31, 1979

'appropriate action including the use of force within the framework of its constitutional procedure.' It also sought to help the cause of Afghan rebels by all means and through Pakistan, Egypt, China etc. The object was to contain the Soviet Union as far as possible.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

China's relations with Afghanistan and its response towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had now undergone change. In 1963 China concluded a border agreement with Afghanistan by formally delimiting 48 mile long border and till 1974 it had agreed to provide economic aid of the value of about \$ 72 million. In 1975 Naim, the brother of Daoud, visited China and on January 1, 1985, an agreement was reached between China and Afghanistan. According to this agreement, China provided for a long term interest free Chinese loans of \$55 million to Afghanistan.

China's proximity to the Afghanistan border and near its border the nuclear installations at Lop Nor in Sikiang, and the relation of China with Pakistan in typical form have considerable effect on Afghanistan and Asian balance of power and vice-versa.

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19. Gargi Dutt, China and the Developments in Afghanistan, International Studies, New Delhi, October-December 1980, p.597
 20. Murtafi Zubeida, Afghanistan and the Asian Power Balance, Pakistan Community, Tokyo, April-June, 1975, pp. 283-299.
 21. Gargi Dutt, op.cit., pp. 598.

After the fall of Daoud (1978), China turned its attention towards struggle in Afghanistan's rebel movement and its potentiality. The Sinkiang report also lambasted Moscow for alleging complicity and aid in the rebel movement by Iran, Pakistan, China, and other countries. In separate articles, Pravda and Izvestia had said that Karakorum Highway was being used for transporting arms and ammunition and propaganda material from China for subversive activity in Afghanistan and that Chinese instructors were training Afghan guerillas. Sinkiang alarmed that all that was a smoke-screen to obscure Soviet interference in Afghanistan.²²

Renmin Ribao denounced the Soviet-Afghan treaty of December 5, 1978 as extremely evil intentions. Moscow had openly clamoured that it would intervene ... attempting to create a pretext for the Soviet Union to directly interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs, threaten Pakistan and Iran to aggravate the turmoil, and destabilize the situation around the Persian Gulf, and destabilize the situation around the Persian Gulf so that the Soviet Union can take the opportunity to fish in troubled waters.²³

The Soviet intervention came to China both as a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge was the perception of

22. Ibid., p. 601

23. Daily Report, Beijing, 16 April 1979, p. c3

its security needs and the opportunity for cementing the Sino-pak-US combination. An AFP (Agence France Press) report from Beijing claimed that China had boosted its forces along its 75 kilometres long border with Afghanistan in the Pamir region as they saw the events in Kabul as a new dangerous manifestation of the Soviet policy of trying to encircle China.²⁴

The Chinese perceptions of the developments in Afghanistan were put sarcastically "within less than six months the Kremlin's good friend Taraki was killed by the Kremlin's good friend Amin, and Amin was executed by Karmal, another good friend of Kremlin. This clearly shows that Afghanistan is completely under Soviet control and even the selection of government personnel, their life and death, honour and disgrace, are all decided by Kremlin. Afghanistan had become only a gate through which the Soviet Union could enter the Persian Gulf."²⁵

China did not wish at all to have talks of compromise with Moscow on this issue. A Renmin Ribao observer observed "it is impermissible to tolerate and connive at the aggressors when they try to stall for time, but forward pre-conditions or leave part of their troops behind just to achieve their aggressive aims."

24. A.F.P. dispatch, quoted in the Daily Report, Beijing, December 31, 1979, p. F1

25. Beijing Radio Domestic Service, Mandarin Station Commentary, December 29, 1979.

China put forward three principles for genuine solution of the Afghan problem:

- (1) Withdrawal of the Soviet troops should not be subject to any pre-condition. It should also be beyond the pale of package deal.
- (2) Afghan people should themselves settle their internal affairs.
- (3) All the countries in the world and their people should firmly support the struggle of the Afghan people against²⁶ the Soviet occupational troops.

China did not permit any political solution-- give and take and compromise. It sought the solution only in the complete Soviet withdrawal of troops.

PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The most concern of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was to Pakistan. But it was late in reaction about by 48 hours. It shows more concern about the swelling number of the Afghan refugees. On January 12, 1980, General Zia-ul-Haq said that "the Soviet Union might be right in her claim of having intervened in Afghanistan on the request of the Kabul government but "the flight of 43,000 refugees²⁷ into Pakistan showed the reaction of the Afghan people."

26. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, No. 579, March 20, 1980.

27. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 13, 1980.

General Zia thought it politically expedient to support the cause of the Afghan rebels through the help from the US, China, and others - causing much concern for its another neighbour, India.

Immediately after the Soviet intervention, the Government of Pakistan rushed with a statement issued on December 29, 1979, regarding the situation in Afghanistan:

"Pakistan has a consistent history of defending the inalienable right of the people of every country, big or small, to order their internal affairs in accordance with their own wishes free from dictation or interference by any external power."

"The Government of Pakistan, therefore, views this development with the gravest concern. Its concern is all the more profound since the country which has been subjected to military intervention is an Islamic country, which is its immediate neighbour and is a member of the Islamic conference as well as of the Non-Aligned Movement."²⁸

Gen. Zia made refugee problem a convenient cliché for serving his purposes. He opened camps in Pakistan for the Afghan refugees and allowed the Jamaat-i-Islamia, financed by contributions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to preach among them

28. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, Vol. XXVI, No. 5, January 29-February 4, 1980, p. 15291.

and through them in Afghanistan, With the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan felt insecure from Afghanistan's side. Moreover, Pakistan also continually feels threatened from the Indian side. Her relations with India have not been cordial since 1947 over the Kashmir issue. Further, its internal political instability caused by the MRD (Movement for Restoration of Democracy) by a coalition of various parties and insurgent movements by Baluchis and Sindhis, and its economic vulnerability added new dimensions to its stand on Afghanistan.

CHAPTER-IV

INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A RETROSPECT

The India-Pakistan relations have been acrimonious from the very beginning since 1947—four wars in three decades. The causes of this acrimony may not be ascertained merely in terms of the military threat posed by one to the other. The basic differences in approach and method emerging from the partition, in the political set up, ideologies, economic systems, and the foreign policies are some of the main factors of antagonism between the two countries.

India's image in inter-national affairs came to exist virtually before 1947. The foundations of her international status were firmly laid in 1917 as quasi-independent entity in foreign relations. In the inter-war period, India achieved a measure of autonomy in international affairs, its interests were influential in the council of major states and its fundamental objective of security was not neglected. Its status and prestige increased as Indian representatives abroad became known for their statesmanship.¹ This created a unique situation which provided India a place of primacy in world politics. The

1. Heimsath, Charles H, and Surjit Man Singh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India, New Delhi, p. 3

partition did not change the international status of India. India continued to possess all treaty rights, obligations and prestige inherited from the British India. Her continued membership in the UN was not questioned.

Pakistan, on the other hand, emerged on August 14, 1947 through the bifurcation of the Indian sub-continent. Unlike India, she had no image in international affairs as the foundations of her status were only laid after independence.² She was admitted as new state in the United Nations. She could also not develop a coherent foreign policy because she had to consolidate the results of Independence by unifying its diverse peoples.

The concept of Pakistan was invented by a few Muslim intellectuals in 1933 who claimed that there were two distinct nations in India. This idea was then adopted by the Muslim League at its historic meeting in Lahore in 1940 as implying an independent sovereign homeland for those Indian Muslims who would choose to opt out of a Hindu dominated India.³ While the Two Nation theory of the Muslim League was never accepted by the Hindu-dominated congress party,⁴ whose leaders were all for the creation of a united and strictly secular India with full

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2. UN Document in K. Sarwar Hasan and Zubeida Hasan, Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, p. 3935.
 3. Amaury de Riencourt, India and Pakistan, Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1982-83, Washington, D.C., p. 416.
 4. Ibid.

protection for all religious minorities and impoverished out-castes.

When partition was agreed to, Indian leaders demanded that there should be two dominions based on the geographical contiguity factors and wishes of the people concerned. If this formula had been accepted by Jinnah and his colleagues, the Kashmir problem would have been solved on the basis of the ascertained wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But the Muslim League leaders concurred with the British view that when paramountcy lapsed, the princes of the states would become free to accede to either of the two dominions⁵ or to remain independent.

India's political evolution may be viewed as an enlargement or extension of the inherited framework with major transformation rather than any abrupt change from it. As regards its administrative structure for conducting diplomacy in some of its definitions of national interest and formulations of policies on important subjects and its style of diplomacy, the Nehru government followed the precedents of the previous Indian Government.⁶ As regards Foreign relations of India, there was complete absence of military mindedness. Nehru and

5. K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspective, New Delhi, p. 156.

6. Heimsath, Charles H. and Surjit Man Singh, op.cit., p. 3

other leaders regarded pre-1947 Indian military involvement as imposed by the imperial interests of England. The Congress resolutions on the foreign policy matters in the 1920s and 1930s not only criticised British Government to support Indian interests in the League of Nations and to press move strongly for the rights of Indian overseas, and condemned the use of Indian troops in China and West Asia, but also identified India's political struggle with the world's movements against imperialism and all forms of oppression.⁷

Post 1947 India's policy of non-alignment was not framed with the physical security of the country chiefly in mind. It aimed mainly at three points: full national independence; a calibre of great importance in world affairs; and a mediator providing a kind of buffer between the conflicting power groups. The policy of non-alignment was very active, judging each issue on the basis of its merit. As such, it was the main source of India's power in international political relations and also vis-a-vis USA and USSR. But this policy was powerless against such states as Pakistan and China. India's power in the global system during the 1950's rested on the acknowledgement of India's non-aligned role by other states because India chose not to stress military and economic capabilities but rather rely on the diplomacy to support its objectives—except occasionally in relation to Pakistan where direct military and economic policies

7. Ibid., p. 56

were adopted. Such reliance resulted from a conscious decision to allocate maximum resources, internal as well as external, to the economic development and social progress of the country and to avoid as far as practicable displays of tangible coercive power.⁸

Pakistan formulated its policy vis-a-vis India in the wake of a psychological background of Two-Nation theory and geopolitical insecurity. So, Pakistan, from the start attracted greater Western sympathy than India due to the greater ease in personal contact with Pakistani leaders than with Indians. Early in the fifties Pakistani leaders brought the cold war into the sub-continent by joining CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan began to receive arms from the United States resulting into operation Gibraltar deliberately planned and executed by Pakistani leaders and in 1965 Rann of Kutch war. From 1959 onwards Pakistan started cultivating China. When in 1965, members of the Pakistan National Assembly from East Bengal questioned about the security of East Bengal, the reply was that it was being looked after by China.⁹ Before 1971 war between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh, the United States, China and Pakistan attempted to establish a Washington - Pindi - Peking axis. As Kissinger's secret trip to Peking became public, and it became evident that

8. Ibid., p. 65

9. K. Subrahmanyam, op.cit., p. 158.

the United States and China were lining up behind Gen. Yahya Khan. India concluded the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace and Friendship (1971). The treaty restrained China and the United States from actively intervening in the war over the liberation of Bangladesh.¹⁰

As regards India's domestic scene, India has been an open competitive political system - a sort of participatory democracy. There have been various political parties contending for power within an electoral process. The government is viewed as legitimate. There exists wide-spread participation in the policy at all levels. There is also a fair balance between various governmental authorities. The role of military is confined mainly to the defence needs. Also, considerable freedoms and rights are widely observed. The minorities have been provided special rights to safeguard their culture, education and identity. Certain restrictions have been imposed on freedoms in the public interest.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has developed along conservative lines, but without the benefit of the political stability and continuity. She has passed through a series of political crises. Under Mohammed Ali Jinnah Pakistan moved towards the pluralist democracy. After his death, this tradition came to an end. And with a few exceptions since then military force and authoritarian theocracy have been the main instruments of

10. Ibid., p. 160

governing in Pakistan. The politicians, who formed government at the time of independence from the British rule in 1947, belonged to the Muslim League which had led the movement for Pakistan. After the emergence of Pakistan, this party got involved in many a fissiparous squabbles.

The Bhutto's regime experienced the 1973 constitution. But his electoral victory of March 1977 was too sweeping that the opposition parties declared a nation-wide agitation. The agitation brought General Ziaul Haq to power through a military takeover. He initially promised to eventually return Pakistan to democratic rule. For this purpose, general elections to the Pakistan National Assembly were held in February 1985 on a¹¹ non-party basis. In March, 1985 Gen. Zia-ul-Haq drastically changed the 1973-constitution and gave himself unprecedented¹² dictatorial powers. He became President for another five years¹³ on the basis of referendum held in December 1984. He nominated Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo as his Prime Minister. The martial law¹⁴ also came to end on 1st January 1986, without changing the position of President Zia-ul-Haq.

11. Times of India, New Delhi, February 26, 1985

12. Ibid., March 24, 1985

13. Ibid., March 25, 1985

14. Ibid., January 2, 1986

General Zia's ultimate justification for military rule initially came to rest on his pledge to Islamise the Pakistan society. It is doubtful and untenable if Zia's Islamization strategy could bestow it any legitimacy. But he has been successful in manipulating the geopolitical position of Pakistan since the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan. These events enormously increased the interest of the United States in the stability of Zia's regime. A militarised Pakistan is necessary to the strategic consensus policy of the US in South-West Asia.

In the realm of economic development, India has adopted the strategy of balanced growth and comprehensive planning. Through five year plans, India happens the ninth largest industrial power in the world. Three major problems have been solved; there are plenty of savings for investment; the Green Revolution; and a reasonable amount of foreign exchange. She manufactures virtually all of its consumer goods, therefore imports as little as possible. In case of a global economic depression, India is largely insulated from the buffeting of external forces. With all that, it produces its own computers, has launched space rockets, and possesses nuclear know-how and power.

15. Amaury de Riencourt, op.cit., pp. 418-419.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is predominantly agricultural. Her industrial development was pushed under the auspices of state bureaucracy. Soon after Independence, the government officials adopted rapid industrialisation as their credo because they considered the industrial strength of neighbouring India a threat to Pakistan's survival. The measures were adopted to encourage free enterprise, including import controls, tax exemptions, restriction on labour unions, foreign exchange bonuses and direct involvement of the state in setting up industries through Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and transferring the same to the private sector.¹⁶

During the Ayub era (1959-69) Pakistan entered a new phase of economic development. American aid and investment flowed in Pakistan through military alliances. American advisers, economic and technical experts and planners played a leading role in the country's development strategies and plans. The entrepreneurial role of the State was further enhanced. Bhutto's period saw the nationalization programmes. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's regime saw the enormous American aid and assistance (military and economic) in the wake of the changing circumstances in Iran and Afghanistan. Thirty seven years later, there is no

16. Hassan N. Gardezi, Pakistan: Emergence of Bureaucratic Military Oligarchy, Patriot, New Delhi, April 1, 1985.

significant change. Although some modest industrialization has taken place, it continues to depend on foreign aid and assistance. While India remains the dominant industrial power in the region. One of the causes of Pakistan's low economic development is the more emphasis on defence expenditure. Her defence expenditure (per capita) is about twenty one times more than that of India.¹⁷

The atmosphere between India and Pakistan is emotionally highly charged. The close cultural, linguistic and racial identification of Indians and Pakistanis could not lead to harmonise national differences. The Pakistani leadership developed a sense of security and identity. Its sense of insecurity also grew from the distance between its Eastern and Western parts separated by India and from its inability to gain Kashmir. So, Pakistan sought to defend her existence against India. And in doing so Pakistan projected India as an aggressive Hindu state. The case of Kashmir-a Muslim majority area-was cited as an example wherein India had refused to relinquish her control over that state. A Karachi daily, 'The Dawn' advocated: "if the main concern of Christian West is the containment of Chinese communism, the main concern of Muslim Pakistan is the containment of militarist and militant Hinduism."¹⁸

17. Amaury de Riencourt, op.cit., p. 422

18. The Dawn, Karachi, April 26, 1963.

pakistan's foreign policy, with such psychological background, was pursued to seek external support to redress the geopolitical inequality vis-a-vis India and to achieve a favourable settlement on Kashmir.¹⁹ Three important elements of Pakistan's foreign policy have been: to ensure national security, to create and achieve solidarity with Islamic world, and to accelerate the economic development through friendship with other countries. For a few years after 1947, Pakistan's policies on the world problems were similar to those of India.²⁰ But Pakistan did not like India's increasing role and influence. Secondly, Britain's indifference to Pakistan in the disputes with India disappointed Pakistan. Thirdly, there was also lack of Arab interest in the proposed Islamic front. All these factors led Pakistan to the Great Powers for aid. Simultaneously, the US was extending the policy of military alignment into Asia. The US-Pakistan defence agreement and the membership of Pakistan in regional alliances improved Pakistan's military capability. But her relations with India got more intensified.²¹

The deep seated distrust of both the countries against each other has served as stumbling block to improve their relations with each other. But from time to time, the Two Governments sought

19. Heimsath Charles, H. and Surjit Man Singh, op.cit., p. 122

20. B.C. Rastogi, Alignment and Non-alignment in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, International Studies, JNU, N.Delhi, Vol.III, October 9, 1962, p. 165.

21. Heimsath Charles H and Surjit Man Singh, op.cit., p. 122

solutions to their similar difficulties in the wake of 1947. The issues on which agreement took place are: refugees of the minority communities, their settlement and compensation; division of pre-partition assets; and allocation of the waters of the Indus river basin. The Kashmir issue, the symbol of political rift between the two states has been unresolved till today. After the so-called 1965 syndrome in India and the 1971 syndrome in Pakistan, a new chapter started in India-Pakistan relations with the Simla Agreement signed in July 1972. It emphasised the resolves of the two countries to settle all differences by peaceful means. It also laid stress on the countries' commitments to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The agreement further went on to detail the various spheres in which co-operation between the two countries should be encouraged.

Subsequent to the Simla Agreement a number of agreements were signed and steps taken to develop this mutual co-operation in various fields. The agreements are:

1. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan agreement signed in New Delhi on April 4, 1974 on the repatriation of prisoners and civil detenus.

22. Ibid., p. 123

23. K.D. Sharma, A Decade of Indo-Pak Relations: Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 1985, pp. 393-394.

24. Ibid.

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2. The Agreement on the release and repatriation of persons detained in either country prior to the 1971 conflict signed on 9 April 1974.
3. An agreement on postal services signed on 14 September 1974.
4. Agreement on resorting telecommunication links between the two countries signed on 14 September 1974.
5. A visa agreement for establishing travel facilities between the two countries signed on 14 September 1974.
6. A pilgrimage protocol signed on 14 September 1974.
7. An agreement for stopping hostile propaganda over television and radio signed on 14 September 1974.
8. A protocol on resumption of trade between India and Pakistan signed on 30 November 1974.
9. A trade agreement between India and Pakistan signed on 23 January 1975 which led to the opening of private sector trade between the two countries.
10. A shipping protocol signed on 15 January 1975.
11. Agreement to restore Civil Aviation links between the two countries which was arrived at in discussion in Islamabad between 12-14 May 1976.
12. Agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries which was reached in discussions in Islamabad between 12-14 May 1976.
13. A Rail agreement between the two countries which was signed on 28 June 1976.

In 1977, the martial law was imposed by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. The new regime claimed a "special new demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India." It has also endeavoured to accelerate the process of normalisation of relations with India. However, in 1978 the Pakistan Government declined to renew the trade agreement which was signed in January 1975 for
25
three years.

Taking into account their respective courses of development in the past 38 years, it is understandable that Pakistan would fear the might of India not just its undoubted military superiority due to sheer numbers, but also the potential for economic and cultural absorption if it comes too close to its giant neighbour. Right now, trade and economic relations between them are negligible, even though India could supply virtually all the consumer requirements of Pakistan; but this precisely what the leaders of Pakistan do not want. Over the longer term they fear that a close economic and cultural relationship would gradually lead to a defacto absorption of Pakistan or at least reduction to the status of a satellite and
26
in effect, partly nullify the costly partition of 1947.

25. Ibid.

26. Amaury de Riencourt, op.cit., p. 418.

CHAPTER-VINDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS -- IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION AFTER
THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN?

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 caused a chain of reactions. It led to the formulation of the Carter Doctrine, the constitution of the Rapid Deployment Force, greatly increased US and Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and the US campaign to establish an anti-Soviet strategic consensus.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan brought intensification to the second cold war which commenced with the breakdown of US Soviet talks on the Indian ocean issue and the conventional arms transfer issue. The fall of the Shah was for the second cold war what the Chinese communist revolution was to the first. One could draw a similar analogy between Afghanistan¹ in 1979 and Czechoslovakia in 1948.

The developing world forms the arena of the second cold war. The Soviet help to Angola and Mozambique was seen by the US as an attempt to dominate the Southern seas. The Soviet support to the Ethiopian regime, the coup in South Yemen (1978) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) have been seen

1. P.B. Sinha, Pakistan's Role and Its Implications, The Second Cold War, edited by K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, p. 66

by the US as a prelude to closing in on Saudi Arabia and controlling the Bab-el-Mandeb waterway.² Secondly, the developed nations are more dependent now on the raw materials and markets of the developing countries than ever before. Also, in order to avoid secular stagnation rich countries need an ever increasing rate of development which must be accompanied by an outlet for the use of their growing capital stock.³ While poor countries need an accelerating rate of development to increase their export potential for avoiding deficit in balance of payment.⁴ Thirdly, some of the developing countries occupy vital strategic locations or constitute appropriate sites for electronic surveillance stations.⁵ Fourthly, the second cold war tends to divide the non-aligned into those leaning towards the US and some other leaning towards the Soviet Union.⁶ Fifthly, the second cold war continues to impose stress and strains on the developing countries. Arms transfers and economic aid are the potent means to manipulate them. Also, the developing world continues to be subject to increasing intervention, pressures, and arms race. Lastly and importantly, the Indian ocean has become a focus of the new cold war confrontation. External involvement here has

2. Ibid., p. 20

3. M.L. Jhingan, The Economics of Development and Planning, Delhi, p. 1.

4. Ibid.

5. K. Subrahmanyam, (ed), The Second Cold War, ABC, New Delhi, 1982, p. 21.

6. Ibid.

grown creating more regional instabilities and inviting further⁷ involvement by extra-regional powers. The US Central Command and acquisition of facilities in various Indian ocean littoral states indicate the type of involvement of the super-powers in the Indian ocean.

Pakistan, in the wake of the second cold war and especially following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, emerged as a front-line state in the US global strategy. In a report prepared by Francis Fukuyama for the Rand Corporation entitled the security of Pakistan in September 1980, Pakistan was given a vital role in the overall US strategy for the Persian Gulf. The Fukuyama report states three advantages from this role. First, the United States is currently building a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to protect Western access to oil - Pakistan could serve as an extremely important entrepot for an RDF moving into the Persian⁸ Gulf from the east, i.e. from Diego Garcia or the Philippines. Further, the loss of access to Chah Bahar (Iran) naval port could⁹ be compensated by Karachi and Gwadar ports in Pakistan. The second, it would facilitate direct American aid to Afghan rebels thus

7. P.K.S. Mamboodri, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, The Second Cold War, ed. by K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, p. 57.

8. Cited in P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 67

9. Ibid.

keeping Soviet resources and attention engaged in Afghanistan and¹⁰
 away from areas of greater interest to the US, like Europe. Lastly, the
 Pakistani Army and its contingents already stationed in several Gulf¹¹
 states could serve as a proxy force fighting in the Persian Gulf.

In the sub-continental context, about 430,000 Afghan refugees¹²
 poured into Pakistan following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
 The limited economic resources of Pakistan could not allow Pakistan
 Government to sustain the economic burden for a long time without
 foreign economic assistance. Also, the Soviet armed forces on the
 Afghanistan-Pakistan border with the responsibility of defending the¹³
 Afghan border impelled guerilla attacks from the Pakistan side.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan developed certain
 inbuilt strategic interests in Pakistan. The US and her allies
 came out to provide all necessary aid to Pakistan. The Carter
 regime started wooing Pakistan, and offered the \$ 400 million US
 military and economic aid. But Pakistan needed more to avoid
 stagnation. And the aid commitments from European nations to her
 were either modest or none at all. Pakistani officials were
 disappointed by a seeming decline of interest on the part of donor-
 nations. Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Pakistan to provide¹⁴
 up to \$ 750 million to help in military build up. But Pakistan was

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 7, 1984.

13. M.P. Srivastava, Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, Delhi, p. 45.

14. Washington Post, Washington, March 8, 1980.

asking for about \$1.5 billion a year in economic aid from a variety of sources including the US.¹⁵ As a result Pakistan rejected the US offer of \$400 million as 'peanuts' aid. To Gen. Zia-ul-Haq the 'acceptance of the US offer would have detracted from, rather than enhanced, our security'.¹⁶ Pakistan specially dissociated itself from any US initiative to introduce relevant legislation on the aid package in Congress. "It is," Agha Shahi said, "a matter of history that a provision in the 1959 agreement for assistance to Pakistan remained in-operative in the 1971 conflict between Pakistan and India."¹⁷ General Zia-ul-Haq wanted for the US administration to raise its bid which the Reagan administration did and General Zia accepted the US \$3.2 billion military and economic package. In this respect General Zia sustained a dialogue with the Soviet Union, even while playing the role of a conduit for arms to Afghan insurgents and projecting an image of a confrontationist and frontline state vis-a-vis the Soviet Union to the US administration, Congress,¹⁸ and the media.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also brought China closer to Pakistan. On March 6, 1980, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr Agha Shahi, expressed "Pakistan must primarily

15. The Hindu, Madras, February 30, 1980.

16. Cited in Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 150

17. Ibid.

18. P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 68.

rely on its own strength ... as well as the time-tested¹⁹ friendship of China." The Chinese could extend aid to insurgents operating in the north-eastern provinces of Afghanistan using the mountain passes cutting through the narrow neck of land connecting Afghanistan with Sinkiang and then could also funnel aid to rebel groups operating from Pakistani territory as well as in Afghan provinces close to the Pakistani border. The Chinese foreign minister, Mr Huang Hua, was the first foreign dignitary to visit Islamabad after the Soviet intervention; his talks with Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Agha Shahi covered not only Chinese aid to Pakistan and the Afghan rebels but in greater depth the global²⁰ strategic response to the Soviet challenge. Huang also visited an insurgent camp located on Pakistani territory, and assured the²¹ Afghans that their cause enjoyed international backing. Huang also demurred in committing definite Chinese contribution to the²² arming of Pakistan.

The Sino-Pakistani united front against the Soviets in Afghanistan had some political advantages with least deterring impact on the Soviets. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq told Xinhua that "Pakistan is

19. Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 7, 1980.

20. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 168

21. Ibid., p. 169

22. Ibid.

threatened, Iran is encircled. It is an outflanking movement
²³ against China as well." Zia in a television interview on March 1,
 1980 also said that China had given Pakistan a good deal of
 military hardware and would continue to do so China was
 assisting Pakistan with the supply of Mig-19, tanks and, gunboats.
²⁴ China had rushed certain quantities of arms through the Kara Koram
 highway immediately after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The US-pak-Chinese strategic axis has certain repercussions
 vis-a-vis India. The history shows that American arms aid has been
 used against India. Francis Fukuyama, in his report on the
 Security of Pakistan, laid down, "The central point made by the
 officers in-charge of planning at the Joint Staff Headquarters and
 by numerous other Pakistanis was that regardless of what happened
 on the Western border, Pakistan's major pre-occupation was and
 would remain India."²⁵ Several other Western observers including a
 US congressional team which visited Pakistan in October 1981 have
 also come to conclude that India is and will continue to be the
 principal concern of Pakistani armed forces notwithstanding the
²⁶ developments in Afghanistan. Pakistan planned the raising of five
 new divisions over the next two years to double the deployment along

23. Cited in Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 170.

24. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 2, 1980.

25. Cited in P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 70

26. Ibid.

the Afghan border without reducing its present strength on the Indian front.²⁷ Indian defence experts also believe that given Afghanistan's rugged mountaneous terrain with narrow roads running through high mountains, the sophisticated weapons like an armoured personnel carrier will be exposing itself to great risk of direct heavy incapacitating fire which would not only take a heavy toll of its human cargo but would also block the narrow roadways which crisscross the tough terrains. Experts believe that an ideal operating surface for armoured personnel carriers like the Howitzers, is a vast expanse of even ground—something²⁸ like the Indo-Pakistani border.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan brought new contours in the US-Pak collusion which have direct bearing on India's security. Dr Henry Kissinger conceived the Soviet attack on Pakistan impossible and saw the real threat in the Indo-Soviet co-operation. To him "India may seek, with splitting Baluchistan and the NWFP and occupy (Pakistan held) Kashmir. Both India and²⁹ the Soviet Union would then be surrounded by weak client states."

Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Indo-Pak relations have been affected as follows:

(1) India's stand vis-a-vis developments in Afghanistan adversely affected the process of confidence building between India and

27. The Hindu, Madras, February 3, 1980

28. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, October 29 - November 4, 1985, Vol. XXXI, No. 32, p. 1884.

29. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 23, 1980.

Pakistan. Initially Gen. Ziaul Haq expressed the urge of co-operation between India and Pakistan to work out a just solution of the Afghan problem. He also proposed to station a peace keeping force consisting of contingents from India, Pakistan and Iran to oversee the border of Afghanistan.³⁰ But Mrs. Indira Gandhi's refusal to openly condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provoked much distrust of India. She defended the Soviet justification of their Afghan intervention but this did not mean support for the Soviet intervention. Secondly, the rearming of Pakistan by the US and China, and the extension of great power confrontation to South Asia were more destabilising for the whole area, and for each of its members than what had happened in the Hindukush. Third, the main thrust of India's diplomacy was to defuse the crisis and dam the confrontation.³¹ While Pakistan suggested that "instead of protesting about Pakistan's arms acquisitions, India should more usefully turn to supporting Pakistan in its endeavour to see that Soviet forces leave Afghanistan."³² India as such should be pleased that Pakistan was taking on the Soviet giant, thereby making a solid contribution to the security and stability of the region.³³ Thus there was no meeting ground between

30. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, February 7, 1980

31. Times of India, New Delhi, January 31, 1980.

32. K.P. Sharma, A. Decade of Indo-Pak Relations, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 1985, p. 400

33. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 117

Pakistan's and India's regional strategic thinking.³⁴ And Indian view to confront Soviet presence in Afghanistan with a matching military build up in Pakistan only intensified the prevailing tensions in the region. General Zia-ul-Haq offended Indian sensibilities by expressing the view that 'the people of Kashmir are yearning for the restoration of their rights along with the people of Palestine' before the First Islamic Meet in Islamabad³⁵ in January 1980. He also remarked before the first Islamic Meet, that "it is for the Muslim countries to get together to defend the sovereignty of a Muslim country, not only of Afghanistan, but also of the entire Islamic world."³⁶ Such statements only outraged the normalisation between the two countries.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan thus did not bring India and Pakistan together in search of common security and stability. India having a substantial \$ 1.6 billion new arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1981 was not able to offer Pakistan a regional security and stability strategy. Nor Pakistan showed the slightest inclination to move away from its special relationship with China, the United States, and the Islamic world. In short "the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has not released fluids of friendship in South Asia. If anything, it has sharpened the traditional strategic divisions of the

34. The Hindu, Madras, February 5, 1980.

35. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 28, 1980.

36. Pakistan Times, Lahore, January 28, 1980.

region or at least reinforced them³⁷. Further, the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim riots in several towns of India in 1980 was utilized by Gen. Zia to speak for the welfare of 80 million Indian Muslims. The Government of India lodged a diplomatic protest. The Hindu observed: "once again the Indo-pakistan syndrome was producing multiple symptoms of a much deeper malaise that threatening to put the clock back to the pre-partition days. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Ziaul Haq made some reassuring noises about the need for better understanding between the two neighbouring countries in the sub-continent. But he is back at the old game of India-baiting and has started to talk darkly of Indian ill will towards Pakistan. The martial law regime is propagating the kind of animosity that could place the two countries on a collision course again."³⁸

(2) The acquisition of ultra-sophisticated arms by Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has adversely affected the relations between India and Pakistan. The Indian focus has been on the danger US arms aid to Pakistan would pose to the sub-continent. In February 1980 the Foreign³⁹

37. Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, July 15, 1980

38. The Hindu, Madras, August 31, 1980.

39. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 30, 1980.

Secretary of India, Mr Ram S. the made it clear that "India was not against Pakistan getting military help from the United States but this should not contribute to tensions in the sub-continent." 40

In June 1981 the Foreign Minister of India Shri P.V. Narsimha Rao visited Pakistan and discussed with his counterpart Mr Agha Shahi various matters including the subject of arms acquisition by India and Pakistan. Immediately, it was announced that an offer had been made for Pakistan to receive US \$3.2 billion worth arms and economic assistance from the USA. It was also announced that Pakistan would be permitted to buy F-16 aircraft from the United States. Expressing defence needs of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan said, "our military purchase programme is related exclusively to the defence needs of the country which have acquired an urgency in view of the deterioration in our security environment resulting in particular 41 from the recent development in Afghanistan."

The Government of India took serious note of this development and expressed its concern at the introduction of extremely sophisticated armaments into the region. On June 16, 1981 it was made clear that "the Government of India acknowledges that every country has a right to acquire weapons for self-defence. It has

40. Times of India, New Delhi, February 7, 1980.

41. The Asian Recorder, July 30-August 5, 1980, Vol. XXVII, No. 31, pp. 16148-9.

not commented in any way while Pakistan has been steadily increasing and modernizing its military strength over the past decade. The agreement announced yesterday is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively different. It could introduce immediately a new level of weapon sophistication into the region which would affect the existing balance⁴²."

Late Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on July 10, 1981 told a News Conference in New Delhi that acquisition of arms must only be according to needs and legitimacy. But the sub-continent is being willy-nilly pushed into an arms race increasing financial burden on our people at a time when our limited resources should have been entirely used for the needs of our people and to make up for lost time in technological and scientific progress⁴³. The US Secretary for Defence Mr Casper Weinberger stated in Islamabad on 2 October 1983 "the US is trying to provide Pakistan advanced weaponry but we do not have anything much more advanced than the F-16"⁴⁴.

A leading Pakistani military thinker Lt. Gen. (retd.) A.I. Akram, while rejecting Indian logic on October 3, 1983, propounded a theory that Pakistan's defence capabilities must correspond to the size of the threat it faced and not to the

42. The Times of India, New Delhi, June 17, 1981.

43. Indian Express, New Delhi, July 11, 1981.

44. Cited in Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 1985, p. 398.

size of its territory or population. According to him 'the main military threat to India, if it is there, comes from Pakistan. There was no serious threat to India from China because there can not be a great war in the Himalyas and peninsular India was out of the invasion courses. But we are under a bigger threat both from India and the Soviet Union.'

Consequently, a continued supply of sophisticated US weapons to Pakistan and its matching by India escalated the arms race between India and Pakistan. When Pakistan completes the present equipment acquisition programme by 1986-87, it will have many more modern fighter bombers, such as the F-16, many more squadrons of M-60 tanks, more Cobra helicopters, TOW anti-tank missiles, and so on. Pakistan has also been offered US \$103 million worth of arms by USA (1985) in addition to the \$3.2 billion military and economic aid package (1981). The new arms package is designated to bolster Pakistan's ground offensive capability using armoured personnel carrier and 155 mm Howitzers. Pakistan also signed a contract with the USA to purchase Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles (1984) a package deal of 500 Side Winders and other defence equipments costing \$50 million (1985)

45. The Asian Recorder, (November-December 2, 1983, Vol. XXIX, No. 48, p. 17488.

46. U.S. Bajpai, India's Security, India International Centre, New Delhi, p. 74.

47. The Asian Recorder, October 29, November 4, 1985, Vol. XXXI, No. 32, p. 18584.

and HAWKEYE planes, scaled-down version of AWACS (1985).⁴⁸

Moreover, Washington's plans to station Perishing-2 nuclear missiles in Pakistan, two naval bases being built at K/MARA and GIVINI on the Arabian coast, building of new airfields and extensive depots to store military hardware arriving from US and publishing a new strategic map of South Asia by the CENTOCOM in which Pakistan is marked as an area fit for stationing the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) - are some developments further escalating the arms race between the two countries. Jack Anderson's disclosure that President Zia has promised to "allow US planes to use Pak-airfields should the Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan adds a new dimension to it.⁴⁹ These airfields are also likely to be used by US AWACS, SR-71 and RC-135 etc. for intelligence gathering over India.⁵¹

48. S.R.S. Francis, Premier, I.A.S. Main Manual, Madras, 1985, p. 6.40-41.

49. V.D. Chopra, US-Pak Collusion - New Contours, Patriot, New Delhi, February 11, 1985.

50. Strategic Analysis, IDSA, New Delhi, April 1984, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 12.3.

51. V.D. Chopra, op.cit.

Impelled by the compulsions arising from such developments which threaten Indian security, the Government of India immediately after the visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Mr Ram Shathe to Pakistan in February 1980 announced the purchase of \$1.6 billion⁵² worth of arms from the USSR over a period of 15 years. Since then India's arms purchase from the USSR include:

- (i) New T-72 tanks, BMP Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV's) ZSU-2-3 radar controlled anti-aircraft weapons, low level surface-to-air missiles (SAM) for the army.
- (ii) Various versions of MIG-23, some MIG-25, MIG-27 and MIG-29 aircraft, IL-76 and AN-32 transport aircraft, Mi-25 attack helicopters and missiles for the airforce.
- (iii) Kashin class destroyers and IL-38 maritime surveillance aircraft for the navy.

Arms purchased from the Western countries beginning with Rs. 4700 crore 1978 Jaguar deal from U.K. include:

- (i) 90 Mirage 2000 aircrafts from France
- (ii) Ultra-modern MILAN anti-tank missiles, different versions of Matra air-to-air missiles and precision-guided weapons including the A-S-3C laser guided bombs.

52. New York Times, New York, June 1, 1980.

- (iii) The supply of Harrier vertical short take-off and landing air-craft, Sea-king helicopters and Sea-Eagle missiles, advanced surveillance system for the navy and Cymbeline field artillery radar for the army.
- (iv) A contract for the outright purchase of two and licensed manufacture of two more type 209 submarines from West Germany.

Besides, other smaller contracts include heavy machine guns, specialised ammunition, bridging equipment, electronics systems and specialised alpine equipment such as snow-mobiles for troops involved in Operation Meghdoot, the army's code-name⁵³ for the silent war on the glacial wastes along Siachen.

On the whole India is quite capable of safeguarding her land frontiers with Pakistan in purely military terms. Following tables showing the military balance and the comparative fighting strength of both countries can be seen in this respect:

53. India Today, New Delhi, November 15, 1985, pp. 86-87.

MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

| | India | Pakistan |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Men under Arms | 11.3 (Lakh) | 4.85 (lakh) |
| Tanks | 2,400 | 4,600 |
| Artillery pieces | 2,500 | 1,400 |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 600 | 550 |
| Combat Aircraft | 740 | 275 |
| Sub-marines | 8 | 11 |
| Aircraft Carrier | 1 | - |
| Destroyers | 3 | 7 |
| Frigates | 21 | 16 |
| Naval Combat Aircraft | 36 | 3 |

Source: India Today, New Delhi, November 15, 1985, p. 86

Such an arms race between India and Pakistan, however, has become seriously detrimental to the national development of both the countries. "From the purely geopolitical point of view, the problem of security would be immeasurably simplified for both India and Pakistan if the armed forces of the two states were not locked up in mutual confrontation within the sub-continent, but regarded as complementary to each other for the defence of the common geographical unit."⁵⁴

54. J. Bandopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, Second Edition, pp. 48-49.

(3) Pakistan is reported to have reached the Uranium enrichment capability. The father of the Pakistani bomb, Dr A.Q. Khan, has publicly admitted that Pakistani scientists have developed the Uranium enrichment capability and can, if ordered, produce nuclear weapons. And Mr Sajjad Hyder, a retired ambassador, has detailed his views on the weaknesses of the Pakistani nuclear programme and the steps that should be taken to overcome these weaknesses and thus strengthen the country's credibility as a nuclear power.⁵⁵

Jack Anderson, the well-informed American freelance journalist, has disclosed that the bomb being manufactured by Pakistan consists of a sphere of enriched uranium about six inches in diameter suspended within a steel sphere twice as large. All this equipment is surrounded by over 200 pound of conventional shaped charges, enclosed in curved metal plates to form a 21 inch sphere.⁵⁶ While some defence experts, including Pentagon specialists, think that Pakistan has already achieved the capability to put out such quantities of enriched uranium which can produce six bombs annually. According to this estimate Pakistan will be able to accumulate 30 nuclear bombs by 1990. There are others who have predicted that Pakistan will explode its first nuclear bomb in 1986, after it has received the remaining 28 F-16 fighters, all other American weapons under the bilateral deal for 3,200 million

55. The Times of India, New Delhi, August 14, 1984.

56. Pakistan Times, Lahore, May 12, 1985.

57 dollars. Various reports also suggest that Pakistan would
 58 test its atomic bomb in Sinkiang.

The nuclear factor is one of the most irritant factors in India-Pakistan relations. It has increased mutual distrust and suspicion between them. In India's perceptions the Pakistani bomb cannot have any relevance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan or to China or any other neighbouring countries. While Pakistan erroneously sees threat from India. There are, however, certain political and strategic implications of the Pakistani bomb vis-a-vis India. Some of the American strategists have tried to explain the rationale underlying the Pakistani nuclear strategy. Prof. Stephen Cohen pointed out: "Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted and whose security related resources are inadequate. Yet these states will not go away nor can they be ignored. Pakistan (Like Taiwan, South Korea, Israel and South Africa) has the capacity to fight, to go nuclear, to influence the global strategic balance (if only by collapsing) and, lastly, in a strategic geographical location surrounded by the three largest states in the world and adjacent to the mouth of the Persian Gulf." Pakistan is following the successful examples of Israel and South Africa in following a policy of deterrence through nuclear

58. The Patriot, New Delhi, February 11, 1985.

58. Strategic Digest, New Delhi, December 1985, p. 1577

59
ambiguity.

The proposals presented to India by the President of Pakistan both in bilateral communications to the Indian Prime Minister and at international level, lack credibility. These proposals include:

- (a) To declare South Asia a nuclear - weapon free zone;
- (b) to sign the NPT treaty simultaneously;
- (c) to sign a bilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
- (d) to agree to an international inspection team to visit and inspect each and every nuclear facility in each of the two countries; and
- (e) to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.

60

Talk of nuclear free zones is only a propaganda ploy meant to deceive the world. There is only one such zone in the world - the Latin American nuclear weapon zone. But even that treaty has not come into full force 18 years after it was signed; Chile and Brazil have not brought the treaty into full force. Both Argentina and Brazil have reservations on the right to carry out peaceful nuclear exploisions. Further, Latin American free zone is not fully respected by the nuclear weapon powers. Recently the book

59. K. Subrahmanyam, Why Pak Wants the Bomb, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, October 1981, p. 1206.

60. A.Q. Khan, Indian Nuclear Policy and Pakistan Plan, Strategic Digest, New Delhi, December 1985, p. 1570.

'Nuclear Battlefields' by William Arkins discloses that the USA has contingency plans to introduce in certain circumstances 32 nuclear anti-submarine weapons into Puerto Rico which is supposed to be covered by the LATIN American nuclear weapon free zone. Secondly, warships of nuclear weapon countries sail in the sea areas covered by the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone.
61

So far as the NPT treaty is concerned, the very character of the treaty is discriminatory. It bans even nuclear explosions for peaceful economic purposes by nuclear powers. This treaty is clearly a neo-imperialistic manoeuvre on the part of the super-powers to perpetuate the grossly iniquitous and immoral power-political structure of the international system.
62

The relentless nuclear arms build-up by the nuclear weapons states, or what is known as the vertical proliferation, is not a matter of concern to the NPT regime. Its sole concern is the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries - the horizontal proliferation. Therefore, it is not possible for India, in terms of her political tradition and economic compulsions, to sign this treaty as proposed by Pakistan. The use of nuclear technology for economic development is the only way to solve India's economic problem.

61. K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, September 1985, pp. 551-552.

62. J. Bandyopadhyaya, op.cit., 104.

Pakistan's offer of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities is also subject to so many qualifications. So long as Pakistan has enriched uranium bombs in the basement, it would be difficult to really verify how many nuclear weapons there are really. It is conceivable that once a mutual inspection agreement is signed, a break out could occur with Pakistan having several enriched uranium weapons hidden away. Secondly, the facilities to be inspected by the two sides are very asymmetrical. While in the case of Pakistan it will cover only the reprocessing cell and the centrifuge facility, in the case of India it will include the fast breeder reactor, the Madras reactor, the Thruva reactor, Trombay and other reprocessing plants and also centrifuge facilities.⁶³

As regards an international inspection team to visit nuclear facilities, so far no operational inspection procedures have been developed for facilities like fast breeder reactors or uranium centrifuge enrichment. These activities have hitherto been undertaken only by the nuclear weapon powers and they have exempted such installation from the inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The two centrifuge uranium enrichment plants, URENCO and EUROIF, function largely on a self-safeguarding basis since they run as multinational ventures and the personnel of one nation are expected to keep watch on those from other nations.⁶⁴

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 551

Regarding the proposals to sign a bilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, it may be held the threats are not posed by weapons alone. Threats arise out of weapons enveloped in adversarial political relations. The British and French nuclear weapons do not pose threats to other West European countries or each other. Similarly, the US nuclear weapons are not seen as posing threats to Canada or Mexico but do pose a threat to Cuba. So, in order to have arms control agreements, the political relationship should be addressed along with signing the treaties.

India's above mentioned response as regards the proposals offered by Pakistan is held negative by the Pakistani leaders including A.Q. Khan. To him "the Indians are not only dreaming of competing with China in nuclear weaponry but also of subjecting Pakistan to perpetual nuclear black-mail." He has also quoted Jack Anderson's exposure that "India appears to be mastering the more sophisticated technique of building a hydrogen bomb. The hydrogen bomb is being built at Bhabha Research Centre near Bombay. About three dozen scientists are trying to refine a process called inertial confinement fusion. India since 1983 has been stock piling separated plutonium that is ideal for weapons. At full capacity, the plant can process 100 tons of spent fuel a year, separating out as much as 150 kg. of weapons grade

65. Strategic Digest, New Delhi, December 1985, p. 1570

plutonium. Six to eight kilos are enough for nuclear bomb." ⁶⁶
 Such statements had detrimental effect on the reduction of
 nuclear confrontation in Indo-Pak relations.

The Indo-Pak nuclear confrontation has been reduced to
 some extent as a result of a mutual understanding between both
 the countries on December 17, 1985, agreeing not to attack each
 other's nuclear facilities. The understanding is a step towards
 confidence-building. There was no agreement over the nature
 of respective nuclear programmes. The understanding would serve
 to remove the allegation in Pakistan that India plans to attack
 on the nuclear facility at Kahuta. India offered to give an
 undertaking that it would not do any such thing. While General
 Zia asserted that Pakistan's nuclear programme was entirely
 peaceful. Also, Pakistan might review its acquisition of sophis-
 ticated arms once there was an improvement in bilateral relations. ⁶⁷

(4) Impact on Economic Development: The Soviet intervention
 has imposed in broad quantitative terms the financial, economic,
 social and political costs on Pakistan. Taking the sixth five
 year plan of Pakistan (1983-88) as a reference, the direct fixed
 costs to Pakistan exchequer of maintaining three million Afghan
 refugees are at US \$300 million annually exclusive of
 international donations. Loss of import duty for exempting all

66. Ibid.

67. The Times of India, New Delhi, December 18, 1985

relief vehicles and goods comes to about US \$50 million (1984) annually. Social services and infrastructural development have also been adversely affected. Scarce resources such as cement have to be diverted for refugee relief and rehabilitation from development projects.⁶⁸ Further, labour displacement by refugees, the ecological costs from deforestation and overgrazing resulting into soil erosion, flash-flooding, and eventually affecting agricultural land and weather cycle, also form the impact of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan on the economic development of Pakistan. To these may be added the demographic changes with the refugees outnumbering the local inhabitants in a number of areas mainly confined to the NWFP and Baluchistan. Their importation into the Punjab had inevitably led to a reaction finding expression in political dissent. Also, the social fabrics of Pakistan is being eroded far more effectively by the rapid rise of heroin addiction in Pakistan which has reached some three hundred thousand people.⁶⁹ The revolution in Iran drove the Iranian heroin chemists to Pakistan and the Afghan crisis led to a vast increase in opium production.⁷⁰ Moreover, the fiscal cost of the Afghan refugees comes to be 8 billion a year (1984). Thus, the Afghan problem has brought an adverse affect on the economy of Pakistan by making it dependent on foreign aid to maintain the Afghan

68. Ibid. March 3, 1984.

69. The Times of India, March 8, 1984.

70. M.G. Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy, Agra, First edition, 1985, p. 154.

refugees. Sajjad Hyder, the former diplomat of Pakistan, said in 1984 that "the 40 billion that will have to spend on the refugees would suffice for 85 per cent of the cost of the projected Kalabagh dam on whose energy generation our economy will depend in large part. It would be enough to pay for two 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plants at Chashura. It would enable us to produce completely indigenous nuclear capability along with a credible medium range delivery system which is vital in the context of our security vis-a-vis India⁷¹"

Apart from the cost of maintaining Afghan refugees, Pakistan embarked on a continual increase of the defence expenditure. For both the costs incurred out of maintaining the Afghan refugees and increasing defence expenditure, Pakistan has been getting certain external financial help and assistance. But Pakistan's defence budget does not include the assistance received from other countries. While references are made in Pakistan to the financial assistance from friendly Arab countries for purchase of military hardware, details about repayments of interest rates of such assistance, if any, have never been published. It has been disclosed in the US Congress that Saudi Arabia has been financing the military purchase by Pakistan from the USA and other countries.⁷²

71. Sajjad Hyder, Afghan Issue, Damage to Society and Economy, The Times of India, New Delhi, March 8, 1984.

72. R.R. Subramaniam Defence Burden on Pakistan, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, December 1985, p. 862.

The defence build up of Pakistan entailing an escalating arms race between India and Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been acting as continuous drain on the resources which might be employed for ameliorating the conditions of poor masses. Late Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi, saw this financial burden "on our people at a time when are limited resources should have been entirely used for the needs of our people and to make up for lost time in technological and scientific progress."⁷³

The effort by India to match Pakistan's acquisition is full of implications. The extent of money involved in the new acquisitions is mind-boggling. No one will ever know the exact amounts involved in purchases from the USSR, but knowledgeable sources put the value of the contracts signed after 1981 at a staggering Rs. 18,000 crore, enough to install more than 15000 MW power capacity, which was the total achieved in the Sixth Five Year plan. While money for the purchase of arms from the western market include Rs. 1100 crore earmarked for 1978 Jaguar deal, Rs. 3500 crore for 90 Mirage 2000 aircraft - equivalent in value to the total money spent so far in the country in setting up cement plants, over 1000 crore worth of the ultra-modern MILAN anti-tank missiles and other weapons equivalent to launching ten communication satellites, Rs. 3,000 crore for the supply of Harrier Vertical/Short

73. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 11, 1981.

take-off and landing aircraft, Sea-King helicopters and Sea-Eagle missiles, and a contract of still unknown financial magnitude for the outright purchase of two and licensed manufacture of two more Type 29 submarines from West Germany. Besides, hundred of crores⁷⁴ rupees have been committed for sundry other smaller contracts.

The government has also agreed in principle to making a number of other multi-billion rupee commitments. The more significant among these are 155 mm artillery gun purchase for approximately Rs. 1600 crores, a Rs. 4000 crore computer system and approximately Rs. 200 crore for the acquisition of Escorter-3⁷⁵ radar-controlled, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.

Purchases apart, an enormous amount of money has also been spent in domestic production, again geared towards modernization. But the most of the innovative and ultra-expensive indigenous effort is concentrated in the field of computerisation and automation since, with the increasing mobility of forces in combat today, the catch-phrase in 'C3I' - standing for Command, Control and Communication and Intelligence. India's answer to this problem is the Rs. 500 crore plan AREN (Army Radio Engineering⁷⁶ Network).

74. India Today, New Delhi, November 15, 1985, p. 86

75. Ibid, p 87.

76. Ibid, p. 87

This unprecedented and almost frightening spending spree is primarily responsible for taking the country's defence budget to Rs. 7688 crore this year 1985-86 more than twice as much as it was in 1980/81 (Rs. 3866.77 crore). If the current rate of growth of defence spending is maintained, and with the anticipated new acquisitions, the defence budget may cross the Rs. 20000 crore mark in the next five years. According to a confidential Defence Ministry estimate the total defence spending in the seventh plan period could cross Rs. 75000 crore. This is more than the seventh plan outlay for any sector, and, incidently, nearly twice as much as the allocation for power.⁷⁷

(5) The Confidence Building Measures: There have been, before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, occasional endeavours for a constructive dialogue between the two countries on bilateral problems like the Simla Agreement 1972 and other subsequent agreements which have already been discussed. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "India built a tenuous bridge to Pakistan."⁷⁸ Late Mrs. Gandhi chose the foreign secretary, Ram Sathe, to undertake a probing mission to Pakistan. The discussion on bilateral issues was marked by a restoration of both countries' commitment to the Simla Agreement which, both

77. Ibid.

78. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 116

said, provided a suitable framework to establish a co-operative relationship. General Zia also expressed that India and Pakistan⁷⁹ both should act together to defuse the Afghan crisis.

On April 10, 1980 the second mission of India headed by Sardar Swaran Singh went to Pakistan. On the eve of his departure from Delhi, the Indian press saw a "far greater degree of closeness in the Indian and Pakistani approaches to the situation created by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan."⁸⁰ Sardar Swaran Singh emphasised the need to break away with past, to narrow down the differences and to promote peace and stability in the region. The Pakistan foreign minister, Mr Agha Shahi, reiterated good neighbourliness and tension-free relations. General Zia renewed his proposal for mutual force reduction, conceding for the first time, that India's defence commitment was far larger than Pakistan's but arguing that Pakistan's commitment had also increased with Soviet forces stationed in Afghanistan. The talks ended with good-friendly gestures to continue trade, travel, tourism,⁸¹ cultural exchange and sports.

In July 1980 the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr Agha Shahi, visited India and asked for serious modification

79. Indian Express, New Delhi, February 6, 1980.

80. Ibid., April 10, 1980.

81. The Asian Recorder, August 12-18, 1980. Vol. XXVI, No. 3, p. 155-95.

of India's strategic thinking with regard to Pakistan as a pre-condition for better political and economic relations. He demanded a just and amicable settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, and mutual force reduction by the field commanders meet of both the countries which was not accepted by the Government of India. He also reiterated the need to turn South Asia into a nuclear free zone, which was also not acceded to by India.

In June 1981, the then Foreign Minister of India, Mr Narsimha Rao visited Pakistan. Both the countries ruled out the use of force or the threat of use of force between them. Reiterating their commitment to the Simla Agreement, both sides called the Simla Agreement constituting a firm foundation for preserving peace and improving relations between the two countries. Both countries expressed their intention to expand mutual co-operation in different fields. Immediately the announcement of US \$3.2 billion military and economic aid to Pakistan and the permission to purchase F-16 by Pakistan from the US shattered the confidence-building move between India and Pakistan.

On November 11, 1981 Pakistan put forward a proposal for a draft of guarantees of non-aggression between India and Pakistan. The proposal suggested Pakistan's readiness to enter into immediate

82. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 17, 1980.

83. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 11, 1981.

consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of the Simla Agreement.⁸⁴ On November 25, 1981 the Government of India made her response to Pakistan's offer of 'No war pact'. The response was made on the basis of India's offer of no war pact to Pakistan made as early as in 1949. The Foreign Minister of India, P.V. Narsimha Rao declared in parliament that India's stand is the same as its original offer "with no exceptions, no conditions and no variations. Our attitude will thus be positive on the basis that Pakistan's offer constitutes an acceptance for the first time of India's offer of a no-war pact which has stood intact since 1949 and as further amplification of the Simla Agreement."⁸⁵

Historical Background of the No-war Pact:

The first proposal of No war pact was made by the former Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru on December 22, 1949 with his counterpart late Liaqat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. The proposal stated that "the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being desirous of promoting friendship and good-will between their peoples who have many common ties hereby declare that they condemn resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future dispute

84. The Asian Recorder, December 24-31, 1981, Vol. XXVII, No. 52, p. 16377-8.

85. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 26, 1981

86
between them." But this proposal could not take its ground.

Similarly in 1959 President Ayub Proposed for a Joint Defence Scheme by India and Pakistan. Nehru rejected it by asking: "Against whom?" This led Mr Manzur Qadir, Pakistan's Foreign Minister to say on October 21, 1959 that "apart from the initial negative reaction from India, there had been no positive reaction." 87 Instead, Nehru put the same proposal as of 1949 which was not accepted by Pakistan. The offer was repeated by Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965, and by Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1968 and by Mr Morarji Desai in 1979. All these proposals were not accepted by Pakistan.

According to Pakistani view "no war pact was *sin qua non* for further good relations. Any further and rash step would be premature. The interests of both the countries will be served best by the early conclusion of the proposed Non-Agression Pact. The prerequisite ground for the promotion of mutual friendship and co-operation can be effectively prepared through this approach." 88

86. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 23, 1949.

87. The Dawn, Karachi, October 22, 1959.

88. The Asian Recorder, August 6-12, 1982, Vol. XXVIII, No. 32, p. 16738.

INDIA'S OFFER OF TREATY OF PEACE AND
FRIENDSHIP TO PAKISTAN

The former Prime Minister of India, late Mrs. Indira Gandhi told the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr Agha Shahi to have a friendship treaty with Pakistan. She expressed the hope that progress would be made over some period of time taking into account of national interest, peace and security in any agreement.
89

But the major hurdles in reaching some understanding even at this preliminary stage developed concerning the respective interpretation of the principle of non-alignment and bilateralism. In India's reckoning, commitment to the principle of non-alignment rules out allowing foreign military bases and being part of another country's strategic consensus. The principle of bilateralism also makes the two countries concerned to settle their disputes without involving a third party or any outside agency.
90

On the issue of Afghanistan, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated India's opposition to any kind of foreign military presence in Afghanistan but conveyed the Soviet intention to take "the stand that they would quit once outside help to the rebels were stopped." She also explained the Soviet justification of their entry into Afghanistan owing to the "growing military presence of other

89. Ibid.

90. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 31, 1982.

powers in the Indian ocean and the installations of nuclear weapons in that region. They wished to guard against such presence⁹¹ reaching their own neighbour?

But to Mrs. Gandhi no-war pact was not enough for making the relations between the two countries sound. "Apart from No-War pact proposal, there are a number of bilateral problems like visa, trade, and cultural exchanges ... a conducive atmosphere will be created for solving mutual problems." Secondly, the offer of No-War pact gave the impression that "India is going to wage war and it is Pakistan which has come forth with a magnificent offer."

Both the proposals were inherently good and if accepted would constitute a positive factor in the normalization process. But both the countries saw 'cautions in giving the proposals flesh and blood'. To India, the motives and intentions underlying the offer of Pakistan were of fake kind lacking genuineness. While to Pakistan India's offer of Treaty of Peace and Friendship seemed "as a loaded missile intended to by-pass the military administration and hit Pakistani public opinion directly". In the view of Pakistan such a treaty was pre-mature.

On November 1, 1982, Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi and the President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq agreed to the establishment of an India-Pakistan Joint Commission. They issued

91. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 31, 1982.

instructions for the rapid conclusion of modalities and
⁹²
 formalities in this regard.

On December 24, 1982 Mr Rasgotra and Mr Niaz Malik, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan respectively, held their talks at New Delhi and identified the areas of convergence and divergence on the draft proposals for a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation and non-aggression pact. They also agreed to set up a joint Indo-pak Commission to strengthen good-neighbourly relations. The Foreign Ministers⁹³ of the two countries were proposed to be its co-chairmen.

On March 10, 1983 the agreement for the setting up of the joint commission was signed. The commission was to promote co-operation between India and Pakistan in a wide range of areas and fields of human endeavour. It was envisaged to provide an institutional framework for strengthening bilateral relations to explain systematically the potential for beneficial relations in a number of agreed fields. It was proposed to meet once a year to promote relations in economic, trade, industrial, education, health, consular, tourism, travel, information and scientific and technological fields. Political and military questions were left
⁹⁴
 out of the purview of the joint commission.

92. Ibid., November 20, November 26, 1982, Vol. XXVIII, No. 48, p. 16908.9.

93. The Economic Times, Bombay, March 11, 1983.

94. Ibid., March 11, 1983.

On June 1-4, 1983 the first meeting of the Indo-pak Joint Commission was held in Pakistan and it decided to set up 4 sub-commissions on (a) economic, health, scientific, and technological areas; (b) trade; (c) information, education, social sciences, culture and sports; and (d) travel, tourism and consular matters. The suggestions were made for the exchange of academicians, scientists, journalists and other media-men, sports team and film personalities between the two countries. Also, specific proposals were put forward for increasing cooperation in agriculture, health, communications, science and technology, trade, education, information and easier travel facilities for the people.

The second commission met on January 17, 1984 opening for some new avenues to better trade and economic relations even though they failed to break the five year old deadlock over a new trade agreement. However, they agreed on how to go about increasing bilateral trade without an institutional framework and also on several co-operative measures in the spheres of planning, agriculture, railways, health, industry, science and technology, and telecommunications. The trade sub-commission apparently skirted the issue of basic approaches to identify 19 items for bulk trading between the two countries, ten of them export to

95. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 5, 1983.

96. Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 1985, p. 396.

97

India and other nine for export to Pakistan. Notwithstanding the major impasse in trade, the Government of India responded positively to supply onions on the request of the Government of Pakistan. Similarly, in early 1984, India purchased 35,000 tonnes of urea from Pakistan at a cost of US \$5.25 million, and in October 1984, India signed an agreement with Pakistan for purchase of 50,000 tonnes of urea valued at over US \$101 million.⁹⁸

The third meeting of the sub-commissions took place in July in 1985. Both countries signed an agreement for cooperation in agricultural research and agreed to promote travel and tourism but failed to reconcile the differences in crucial trade sector. They however agreed for further discussions in order to bring about a reconciliation in basic position. But the two sides identified the police organisations for co-ordination, exchange of information and joint steps to curb the growing menace of narcotic smuggling. It was also agreed to commission the coaxial cable by the end of August. As a result major cities in India and Pakistan have direct telephone link from August 1985. There could be no agreement on exchange of newspapers and periodicals. The issue of terrorism was not discussed in detail during the talks but the Pakistani spokesman said his country

97. The Economic Times, Bombay, July 18, 1984.

98. Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April 1985, p. 396.

was prepared to talk in this regard with India and would welcome
 99
 any suggestion.

On January 9, 1986 in Islamabad the Union Finance Minister of India, Mr V.P. Singh and his pakistani counterpart Mr Mabud-ul-Haq discussed the problems concerned with trade agreement. The discussion covered public and private sector trade, infrastructure and joint ventures.¹⁰⁰ Both India and Pakistan agreed for a long term trade agreement to be signed during the Prime Minister of India, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad this year (1986). Pakistan also agreed in principle to extend the most favoured nation's treatment (MFN) to export from India. Besides, throwing open 42 items to the private sector to import directly from India, the Pakistani government would set up a committee to identify within a month some 200 to 300 additional items that would be traded by the private sector. Both sides also agreed¹⁰¹ on further dialogue in this connection.

Thus, all the deliberations of all the joint commissions along with the four sub-commissions at each meeting have sought to achieve an atmosphere of friendship, constructive cooperation and mutual accommodation. The deliberations have been productive

99. The Economic Times, Bombay, July 5, 1985.

100. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 10, 1986.

101. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 12, 1986.

and satisfactory and a step towards the establishment of a relationship of cordiality, co-operation, mutual trust and understanding between the peoples of India and Pakistan. However, this process of confidence building is being outraged by two factors: one; involvement of Pakistan in the Punjab crisis and two; the conflict on Siachen Glacier.

The Punjab Crisis and Pakistan: The involvement of Pakistan with the extremist and secessionist elements in the Indian state of Punjab makes one factor common between India and Afghanistan - the role of Pakistan and its ally the United States to destabilise these two countries. Jagjit Singh Chauhan claimed that "if war situation develops, the Western countries will have to support our movement. America will also come in a big way and China too may interfere. In such a conflict, Sikhs are going to gain. Politically we can get support from the Western world, anti-¹⁰² communist forces and from northern Indian states." There is also evidence to show that some extremists have taken refuge in Pakistan, receiving training in guerilla warfare, though opinions differ on their strength. Before and during the army action in the Golden Temple at Amritsar in June 1984 there were reports about the movement of extremists across the border into Pakistan and of certain Pakistani agencies' activities operationally supportive of terrorist elements engaged in acts of violence in

102. Patriot, New Delhi, January 21, 1985.

103

the Indian Punjab. The record of Pakistan media in deliberately distorting and misrepresenting events in India in the wake of army operations in Punjab, the extensive coverage given to the statements of secessionist on Pakistani Television in the months of June and July 1984, the supplements brought out in the Pakistani newspapers carrying interviews with known extremists and secessionists and repetitions of articles about so-called 104
Khalistan have further added to the setback in Indo-Pak relations.

The whole sequence of events in Punjab has an identical pattern with Afghanistan in the last five to six years. According to a Washington daily "Afghanistan dissenters are undergoing guerilla training at a base 12 miles north of Peshawar and this former military base is still under the guard of Pakistan soldiers. And almost simultaneously, Indian intelligence agencies started receiving reports that terrorist training camps had been set up on the Indo-Pak border at Narowal, Pasrur and Daska (Sialkot district) Emanabad and Muridke (Sheikhupura district) besides Attok. Fort and Murzee Hill ranges near occupied 105
Kashmir.

103. Ibid.

104. Strategic Digest, New Delhi, April, 1985, p. 399.

105. Patriot, op.cit.

Significantly both at Indo-pak and pak-Afghan border training camps, one of the aspects of the motivational training relates to the need to infiltrate the religious, political and social organisations for reasons of cover, and to ultimately capture these bodies by applying pressures from within. It was after this development that acts of sabotage and killings of individuals began on a large scale both in India and Afghanistan. Thus, notwithstanding the differences in the social systems of India and Afghanistan one conclusion is inevitable—that both these countries have become a special target of attack by the US. The weapon is Vietnamisation of Afghanistan make Afghans fight Afghans in Afghanistan, and make Indians fight Indians in India.¹⁰⁶

However, the President of Pakistan, Ziaul Haq while visiting New Delhi on 3-4 November 1984 gave a healing touch to the Indo-pak relations when he said that nothing would be allowed to come in¹⁰⁷ the way of better understanding between our two countries. The Indo-pak relations also went critical when the hijacking of Indian aircraft by Sikh terrorists to Pakistan took place in September 1981 and in July 1984. The hijackers were lionised, were given VIP lounge facilities at Lahore airport, and interviewed by Pakistan Television. But with the trial of Sikh hijackers on January 10, 1986

106. Ibid.

107. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 5, 1984.

108

three awarded death sentence and seven given life imprisonment, the Indo-Pak relations are likely to gain normalcy.

(B) The Siachen glacier is located in the Karakorams which contain some of the highest peaks in the world and is one of the world's most glaciated sub-polar regions. Among the large glaciers here is Siachen which is 74 km. in length and varies in width from 2 to 8 km. This area missed demarcation during the Simla Agreement 1972 between India and Pakistan. In early June 1985 shoot-outs continued unabated between Indian Army Jawans and Pakistani forces at the Glacier. The dispute arose in April 1984 when Pakistani troops reached the spot and claimed the area as their own. They resorted to firing, which the Indian Jawans repulsed. In February 1985 Pakistani troops made a determined bid to capture the area, but Indian jawans made a pre-emptive attack and captured Sia-La and Dela Endla pass at 1700 ft—
 109
 the key to Siachen.

India became concerned about Siachen only in 1978, when defence authorities were given a mountaineers' map, published in the US showing a demarcation line from east of Shyok to Karakorum pass and excluding the area between Indira Col to Daulat Beg and

108. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 21, 1986

109. The Frontline, Bombay, April 20, May 3, 1985, p. 76.

110. The Asian Recorder, August 6, 13, 1985, Vol. XXXI, No. 32, p. 18443.

Great Karakoram peak from Indian territory. The area, according to Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber, C-in-Chief, Northern Command, had been under Indian control.¹¹¹ While Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr Sahibzada Yakub Khan disputed India's claim to the Siachen glacier area and said that Pakistan would take up the matter again with the Indian Government. He claimed that Siachen glacier area formed a part of northern areas of Pakistan.¹¹²

According to defence experts in New Delhi, Pakistan is co-ordinating its military activity with China in a bid to establish suzerainty over the strategic Siachen glacier in the Ladakh region. There is evidence of Pakistan and China jointly undertaking some reconnaissance missions over the Siachen glacier and Nubra valley. According to experts to achieve its geo-strategic aims Pakistan is now trying to dominate the Indian Nubra valley and the routes going down to Leh. She also wants to capture Indira Col, which is a wedge between its illegally occupied parts of Kashmir and 4500 km. of territory it had illegally ceded to China. With the capture of Indira Col, Pakistan would establish a common border with China.¹¹³ India occupies commanding positions in the region with the control of Sia La and Salatoro passes and can speak from a position of strength.¹¹⁴

111. The Times of India, New Delhi, June, 5, 1985

112. The Indian Express, New Delhi, June 2, 1985

113. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 3, 1986

114. Ibid., January 10, 1986

India, from the very beginning, wanted to resolve this issue bilaterally with Pakistan and aimed at cease-fire before any talks on the dispute. To have cease-fire there have been at least three flag meetings of commanders on both sides to prevent further escalation or fightings. On January 12, 1986 talks between the Indian and Pakistani delegations took place in Islamabad to resolve the thorny Siachen glacier issue. The talks were held in a frank and cordial atmosphere and there was a greater appreciation of each other's perceptions, without being arrived at an agreement. The delegates agreed, however, to meet again in New Delhi in March-and or April 1986.¹¹⁵

Today, ironically enough, the Siachen issue provided another type of wedge - the one of peace. The agreement on a cease-fire and a possible demarcation of this area could be an important first step as a "confidence building measure" to begin general talks on the no-war pact or force reduction that are talked about so often. With this, peace would return to the area which is today the only point on the Indian land frontier where active hostilities prevail.¹¹⁶

115. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 13, 1986.

116. Manoj Joshi, The Siachen Glacier Incident, Strategic Digest, June 1985, p. 671.

Towards Normalisation: The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad on January 18, 1986 to improve their relations. The most important among the topics for their deliberations related to the offer of a no-war pact by Pakistan and a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation urged by India.¹¹⁷ The two sides also discussed the draft on the earlier agreement on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities.

With regard to the nuclear facilities agreement, the substantive part of the draft had been agreed to and only for¹¹⁸ preamble remained to be examined by the two sides. But the two sides failed to resolve their differences over preparing a single comprehensive draft, with Pakistan sticking to its reservations on the question of military bases and acceptance of the principle of bilateralism in settlement of disputes. As regards bilateralism Pakistan has been insisting that bilateral disputes could be raised in international forums despite the Simla agreement. But the Indian stand has been that efforts must be made first to resolve bilateral issue like Kashmir through negotiation and an approach made to a third party by mutual consent.¹¹⁹ While on the question of foreign bases, Pakistan appears to be keen to keep its options open especially in view of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is prepared to assure India that there would not be any territorial threat from its

118. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 17, 1986

118. Ibid., January 22, 1986.

119. Ibid., January 20, 1986.

side in return for a similar assurance from India, but does not want to be tied down in a difficult international situation on the Afghan borders. To this may also be added Pakistan's engagement in negotiations for a new \$ 6.6 billion American aid package including latest sophisticated weapons. However, India and Pakistan have decided to repatriate by March 31, 1986 each other's civilian detainees who have completed their prison
120
terms.

While both sides during talks reiterated the resolve and abiding commitment of the two governments to develop tension-free and good-neighbourly relations and commitment to the Simla agreement. However, they failed to make substantial progress and some of the ticklish issues, like questions of bilateralism and foreign bases for which Pakistan put forward a revised draft giving new formulations, have been left to a meeting of the joint commission to be held in March 1986 under the two Foreign Ministers of both the countries.

120. The Times, of India, New Delhi, January 11, 1986

CHAPTER-VITHE EFFORTS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM AND
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

In the context of India-pakistan relations the continuance of Afghanistan problem adds a great deal to tensions. Pakistan, using it as a cover, continues to get more and more arms from the USA and China, strengthens her defence potential and adopts hostile postures towards India. The resolution of the Afghan problem would reduce the tension and could contribute to the confidence building measures between the two countries. But given the contradictory nature of the assessment of Afghan developments by the various countries concerned, their conception of the Afghan problem and the manner in which it should be resolved have differed. To Pakistan, the United States, China, Iran and other like-minded countries the Soviet military intervention and its fallout constitute the Afghan problem; as a corollary, the basic problem would be solved with the cessation of that
¹ intervention. Viewed from Kabul and Moscow the Soviet action was not cause but the effect of the Afghan problem; the problem was and continues to be the armed foreign intervention. While the

1. P.B. Sinha, the Afghan Problem, ICSA Journal, October-December, 1983. New Delhi, p. 120.

India Government took a regional view of the Afghan problem rather than a spatial global view which prevailed in the United States, China and Pakistan. In the interest of regional stability and balance of power what was needed was to contain the Afghan crisis but not to aggravate it and enlarge its context and scope. It would be necessary to obtain the withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a specific time frame. But this would not be possible if the insurgency was internationalised and if Pakistan were converted into a base for Sino-US military operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Indian Government expressed more concern with the US planning to add substantially to Pakistan's military capability, added further by its nuclear development programme than Afghan problem. It was also made clear that if the US decided to ignore India's sentiments, it would be doing so at the risk of increasing New Delhi's dependence on the Soviet Union for defence requirements to meet the situation. Thus, having reaffirmed the Indo-Soviet strategic linkage, Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that she had not supported or approved the Soviet intervention; she stressed her opposition to all foreign interventions and the presence of foreign troops

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2. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Necessity of Choice, Seminar, New Delhi, No. 246, February 1980.
 3. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 23, 1980.

in third world countries. Mrs. Gandhi's government opened channels of diplomatic dialogues with several countries within and outside the region to explore the possibility of an initiative that would induce the Soviets to pull out the bulk of their troops from Afghanistan within a relatively short⁴ time.

Pakistan expressed its gravest concern at the Soviet intervention, all the more because the victim was an Islamic⁵ nation. It called for the immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of Soviet troops. Among other measures to be adopted later to solve the Afghan problem Pakistan included:

- (i) Afghanistan's status as an Islamic and non-aligned status should be restored;
 - (ii) a conducive atmosphere should be created so that Afghan refugees could return to their homeland with safety, honour and dignity;
 - (iii) the people of Afghanistan should have the government of their own choice without outside interference.
- Pakistan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a condition precedent to any effort to resolve the Afghan problem. It did not recognise the Karmal government and would have nothing to do so long as

4. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome, pp. 10-18.

5. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 30, 1979.

6

the Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Government of Afghanistan demanded complete and reliable cessation of armed aid or any other intervention in its domestic affairs and creation of conditions that would ensure that such interference would not recur in the future. The Soviet troops would remain in their country as long as Afghanistan was subject to continuing armed aggression from the territories of the neighbouring countries; once an agreement was reached and there was cessation and guaranteed non-recurrence of armed intervention, Afghanistan would determine through an accord with the Soviet Union the time-table for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. The question of Soviet military presence was Afghanistan's own internal⁷ affair in which no other country had a right of say.

EFFORTS FOR A SOLUTION

1. Indian initiatives: India adopted the diplomacy of defusing the crisis. She became a member of an international constituency which did not wish to throw away the gains of detente, which

6. P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 120

7. Ibid.

opposed extreme reactions to the Soviet action, and which preserved to lift the cold war and defuse the super-power⁸ confrontation. The Hindu reported that Government intended to mobilise opinion against the growing dangers of great-power involvement in the region. "It is thinking of an Indian initiative to bring the neighbouring countries and the interested powers together to defuse the deepening crisis and foster better understanding amongst them. The proposed diplomatic move will take some time to take shape but preliminary consultations with⁹ the concerned countries will be initiated soon."

On January 25, 1980, the Hindu reported that the Government of India was considering whether it should confine its current exchanges to bilateral talks with other countries in the region or take the initiative in convening a conference of the foreign ministers of the countries to discuss what could be done to avert the danger of big-power rivalries in the region. One of the suggestions was that India should invite Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even Burma to¹⁰ such a conference if these countries were willing to take part. However, such a move could not be materialised.

8. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 115.

9. The Hindu, Madras, January 21, 1980.

10. Ibid., January 25, 1980.

The UN Secretary-General, Mr Kurt Waldheim's talks with Mrs. Gandhi on January 23, 1980 satisfied him that India was trying privately to persuade Moscow at least to thin out its military presence in Afghanistan. He later informed Mrs. Gandhi that Gen. Zia would be delighted to open a dialogue with India.¹¹ Mrs. Gandhi chose the foreign secretary, Ram Sathe, to go to Pakistan for the purpose. A 100 minute talks with his Pakistani counterpart failed to arrive at a common strategy to resolve the Afghan problem. The perceptions of both the countries of the crisis remained widely apart, but there was desire on their part to have strategic co-operation. Gen. Zia expressed that India should assert its position and influence with the Soviet Union to get the Russian troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. He also favoured the raising of a peace keeping mission consisting of India, Pakistan and Iran to facilitate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and to give the people of Afghanistan an opportunity to decide their future.¹² But the Afghan issue was not a regional issue but a global one, so it was the responsibility of the world community to come to its rescue.

After Ram Sathe's visit to Pakistan ranking officials of the Indian foreign office were sent to Colombo, Kathmandu and Dhaka. These diplomatic soundings did not hold out much hope of

11. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 24, 1980

12. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 177

any joint initiative for exerting collective pressures on the super-powers to desist from further involvement in the internal affairs of the region.¹³ None of these countries saw the two developments, viz. the Soviet action in Afghanistan and arming of Pakistan by the United States, thereby deepening super-power rivalries in the region, as India did. The Indian contention that these two inseparable components of the same crisis cannot be tackled compartmentally but have to be dealt with concomitantly as parts of one and the same problem¹⁴ did not make much impression upon them.

On the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko in New Delhi on February 12, 1980, Mrs Gandhi pressed for one or more of the following:

- (1) An immediate token withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan;
- (2) a public pledge that the bulk of the troops would be withdrawn within a specific period of time;
- (3) a statement affirming Soviet adherence to non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries and inviolability of the territory of sovereign nations; and
- (4) Soviet contribution to the creation of a regional security system without both superpowers - the

13. The Hindu, Madras, February 11, 1980.

14. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 20, 1980.

contribution being in the form of pulling out of troops from Afghanistan and a declaration of approval, in principle, of a regional system autonomous of the great-powers.

15

Gromyko refused to make anyone of these gestures. The Indian government failed to convince Moscow that it must withdraw troops from Afghanistan as part of Soviet contribution to normalising the situation in the region. Gromyko, on the other hand, failed to convince India entirely of the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan.¹⁶ However, as Mrs. Gandhi told reporters on February 20, 1980 that she had been assured by the Soviet Union that it would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan if Pakistan stopped training and sending guerrillas for raids. She indicated that the focus of Indian diplomacy was not on the withdrawal of Russian troops but on the stopping of American arms transfer to Pakistan.¹⁷ However, in the first week of April 1980, came the announcement of the Soviet-Afghan treaty formalising the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan.¹⁸ It had a freezing

15. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., pp. 123-124.

16. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 14, 1980.

17. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 27, 1980.

18. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 10, 1980.

effect on India's diplomatic efforts.

The Foreign Minister of Cuba, Mr Isidoro Malemiera Peoli visited New Delhi in April 1980. He made it clear to Mrs. Gandhi that Cuba was trying to bring Gen. Zia and Babrak Karmal together at Havana or anywhere else. Castro, the President of Cuba, himself in a communication to Mrs. Gandhi asked for her help to realize this shared objective. But Gen. Zia turned down the Cuban proposal.²⁰

After rejecting of Cuban initiative Gen. Zia told New Delhi that he would be delighted to receive a special envoy of Mrs. Gandhi. So, Sardar Swaran Singh went to Pakistan on April 10, 1980. He found Gen. Zia surprisingly relaxed about Afghanistan. he had practically ceased fuelling the Afghan insurgency. He was still stubbornly resisting Soviet pressure to meet with Babrak Karmal. In any case, he was now looking at the Afghan crisis through the eyes of the Islamic conference.²¹ However, difference between India and Pakistan on Afghanistan had narrowed as a result of his visit, India wished to seek Pakistan's co-operation to promote peace and security in the region.²² At the meeting between Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi at Salisbury, Gen. Zia offered to have a UN supervisory group

20. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 9, 1980

21. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 131.

22. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 15, 1980.

stationed in Pakistan, drawn from countries like India, to ensure that Afghan rebels were not armed, trained and sent across the border to carry on guerrilla wars. This offer was transmitted by New Delhi to Moscow.²³ After her talks with Leonid Brezhnev in Belgrade on May 8, 1980, Mrs. Gandhi stated that Brezhnev was too happy to keep troops in Afghanistan and was keen on pulling them out. He only wanted the creation of a situation²⁴ which would make this possible.

Meanwhile, the Afghan government offered to work out a political solution through bilateral or trilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran. If Pakistan and Iran pledged that they would not support the Afghan rebels, and if their pledges were underwritten by the United States and the Soviet Union, this would pave the way for withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the release of this proposal, Mrs. Gandhi sent Ram Sathu to Kabul on May 16, 1980. The main thrust of his visit was to emphasise India's support for tripartite talks - among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran or for the convening of a larger forum.²⁵ Also on May 16, 1980, the Islamic Conference began in Islamabad. The Conference set up a three members committee headed by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and including the Foreign Minister of Iran to explore all possible ways of a political settlement including

23. The Hindu, Madras, May 10, 1980.

24. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 15, 1980.

25. The Indian Express, New Delhi, May 17, 1980.

talks with the Soviet Union.

On Narsimha Rao's visit to Moscow on June 3, 1980, it became clear that the Soviets were in no mood to accept the Islamic Conference framework for talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. It was sculpted to deny the Kabul regime the legitimacy it might have. Iran and Pakistan therefore must sit down with Afghanistan at the negotiating table as equals and thrash out the agreed frame of an accord; this would then be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. If India wished to help, it should bring whatever pressure it could on Pakistan to talk to Afghanistan. Also, India could even work for a mini-Geneva-type conference with only those countries which had not taken sides in the Afghan crisis to hammer at the basics of a political solution that would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, the United States and others.²⁷ However, as Rao affirmed, India's ability to influence Soviet action with regard to Afghanistan was very limited.

In July 1980, Narsimha Rao met the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan separately in New York carrying message from one to the other. But nothing could take place to pave the way for solution.

26. The Indian Express, New Delhi, May 20, 1980.

27. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p. 135.

During Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in December 1980, it became explicit that both India and the Soviet Union differed on the issue of continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan's refusal to work with India or the USSR and Gen. Zia's stubborn decision to anchor his foreign policy on the Islamic conference robbed India of its desired role as South Asia's peace keeper and security provider, and diluted the edge of India's pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed
28
forces from Afghanistan.

THE FIRST ISLAMIC MEET

Gen. Zia's first diplomatic triumph to resolve the Afghan problem was the special session of the Foreign Ministers of 37 Islamic countries held at Islamabad from January 27, 1980. Gen. Zia exhorted the Islamic world to join hands not only to make the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan but also to consider ways and means for the collective defence of the Islamic
29
Umma rather than the defence of individual countries. The session decided to suspend Afghanistan from the membership of the organization of the Islamic States and asked member states to withhold recognition to the Babrak Karmal Government and suspend

28. Ibid., p. 139.

29. Extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Islamabad, 1980), p. 20

diplomatic relations with Afghanistan till the complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from that country. It also called upon member states to extend economic aid to the country's neighbouring Afghanistan. It supported the US call³⁰ for a boycott of the Moscow olympics. These decisions of the extraordinary session of the IFMC (Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference) did not help in finding a solution for the Afghan problem.

After rejecting the US \$400 million economic and military aid 'as peanuts', Gen. Zia sought to have an accommodation with the Soviet Union. A report from Islamabad said that Pakistan had offered three alternatives to satisfy Moscow and Kabul: (1) that it was not feeding insurgence (2) any international body could verify the fact or Afghanistan could seal its borders with Pakistan (3) an international force could be stationed in Afghanistan to see that no foreign power interfered in its internal affairs. It could be drawn from the Muslim countries³¹ or non-aligned countries or be raised by the UN. Gen. Zia told a news conference on March 25, 1980, that all doors for a dialogue with Moscow must remain open.³² In view of such development Soviet diplomacy sought to bring about an understanding between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, with or

30. Ibid., pp.76-77.

31. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 8, 1980

32. Ibid., March 26, 1980.

without India's help.

The second conference of Islamic Foreign Minister held in May 1980 in Islamabad decided at the initiative of Pakistan to appoint a panel to explore ways and means of implementing the resolution passed by the extraordinary session of the IFMC in January 1980. The serious differences emerged among the Islamic states on the assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. There were those who wanted Afghanistan to be readmitted to the IFMC and to hear its views on the issue. They also refused to line up behind the anti-Soviet line that Pakistan was advocating. 33 The IFMC panel was deemed to fail from its very inception. It wanted to talk to Afghanistan without recognizing the Babrak Karmal Government. Also, the IFMC had rejected package of proposals made by the Afghan Government on the eve of the Conference. The package included proposals for regional normalization and for bilateral agreements on border security with Iran and Pakistan to be jointly underwritten by the Soviet Union and the US. 34 The Soviet Union repeatedly made it clear that without adequate assurance of Afghanistan's security from external aggression from Pakistan, its forces would not be withdrawn.

33. Bhabani Sen Gupta, India Ties with Russia for Pakistan, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, May 13, 1980.

34. Pakistan Times, Lahore, May 12, 1980.

THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan espoused reactions all over the world like most of the conflict situations posing threat to international peace and security such as Korea, Suez, the Lebanon, the Congo, Czechoslovakia etc. In these cases the Security Council met almost immediately after the armed conflict occurred. But in case of the Afghanistan situation it met about two weeks after the Soviet intervention. Also, fifty-two Members had to make a formal request to convene the Security Council.³⁵ While under the rules any one Member could have made it. The United States and other Western powers adopted a corridor diplomacy, took a back seat in the formal proceedings and non-aligned countries and other took the initiative in sponsoring a draft resolution. The 6-Power (Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia) draft resolution was mildly worded, it avoided condemnation; it merely deplored the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan which was described as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter; and it called "for the withdrawal of foreign troops³⁶ from Afghanistan." But the Soviet Union was not named.

35. UN Doc. 5/13724 and Add 1 and 2, of 3 January 1986.

36. K.P. Saxena, Afghanistan Conflict and the United Nations, International Studies (October-December 1980, New Delhi, 1980, Vol. 19, No. 4, p. 665.

Among the countries in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan only Pakistan joined the debate while India and Iran declined to join.

The 6-power draft resolution failed to secure an adoption because of the veto by the Soviet Union. Two days later, on January 9, 1980 the Philippines and Mexico initiated a procedural resolution under the provisions of "Uniting for Peace" which led to the convening of the Sixth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on January 10, 1980. About Seventy-four delegates participated in the ensuing debate. A draft resolution similar in content as the one vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council was presented by Pakistan on behalf of its twenty-four sponsors. It was adopted by an overwhelming majority. India abstained from voting. The resolution "strongly deplored the recent armed intervention into Afghanistan as inconsistent with a fundamental principle of the UN Charter" and called for an "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their form of government and choose their economic, political, and social system from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever".³⁷ In this resolution the USSR was neither named nor condemned as such. While India gave a categorical explanation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to the annoyance of Pakistan and other countries. The

37. G.A. Resolution ES-6/2 of January 1980, para 4

representative of India B.C. Mishra, recalled India's vital concern for peace and security in the area, reiterated its opposition to the presence of foreign troops and leases in any country. B.C. Mishra said "the Soviet Government had assured our Government that its troops went to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government, a request that was first made by President Amin on 26 December 1979 and repeated by his successor³⁸ on 28 December 1979. We have been further assured that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghan Government." Such instance adopted by India at the United Nations on the situation in Afghanistan was against the stances taken by India during earlier Soviet military³⁹ interventions — in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. And on January 14, 1980 when called upon the stand up and be counted, India joined the ranks of those non-aligned countries which abstained on the General Assembly resolution. While Pakistan with a large number of non-aligned countries joined others in voting for the resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of⁴⁰ the foreign forces.

But both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union rejected the United Nations resolutions adopted at its emergency session in

38. GA, A/ESI-6/PV-1, January 10, 1980, pp. 11-12.

39. K.P. Saksena, op.cit., pp. 673-74.

40. Ibid.,

January 1980 at the regular session in November 1980 and November 1981.

OTHER EFFORTS

Besides UN resolutions other efforts have also been made to resolve the Afghan crisis. Very briefly stated, these include: the declarations of the organisation of Islamic Conference (extraordinary and regular conferences of Islamic Foreign Ministers in Islamabad in January and May 1980 respectively which have already been discussed; and the Taif summit in January 1981; the British proposal for neutralisation of Afghanistan (January-February 1980); the then French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for an international conference (January 1981); the European community's plan for a two-stage international conference (July 1981); President Jimmy Carter's transitional arrangement (March 1980) envisioning a neutral international peace-keeping force in, and international guarantees to Afghanistan; and Iran's proposal for talks (March 1980) and another five point peace plan (November 1981) calling for a theocratic structure for Afghan institutions and for an Islamic peace-keeping force. The Finlandisation of Afghanistan has also been proposed. After World War II, the Soviet Finnish

41

41. P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 121.

treaty led to the evacuation of the Soviet base at Porkkala in return for a pledge that Finland would not join a military arrangement hostile to the Soviet Union and that Moscow would retain the right to intervene if Soviet security were⁴² threatened. However, Kabul and Moscow considered all these proposals as amounting to interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

UN SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY

UN Secretary-General's Mediation: Afghanistan and the Soviet Union both had repeatedly rejected the resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and other efforts outside the UN on the Afghan situation. However, Afghanistan had shown its desire to enter into discussions with Pakistan and Iran but without compromising on its basic stand. Pakistan accepting UN resolutions on Afghanistan also accepted to cooperate in any⁴³ move by the Secretary-General in that regard.

In February 1981, the then UN Secretary-General Mr Kurt Waldheim named Javier Perez de Cuellar as his special representative on Afghanistan to bring the concerned parties to the negotiating table. The Non-aligned Foreign Ministers

42. Jagat S. Mehta, A Neutral Solution, Foreign Policy, Summer 1982, Washington, D.C., pp. 145-146.

43. P.B. Sinha, op.cit., p. 123

in New Delhi in February 1981 provided an opportunity in this respect but Pakistan's insistence on Iran's simultaneous participation in any direct talks with Afghanistan and Iran's refusal to have anything to do with such talks undermined this⁴⁴ opportunity.

On November 18, 1981, the UN General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to promote a political settlement of the Afghan crisis. After his shuttle diplomacy in Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran in April 1982, Diego Cordovez, the UN under Secretary-General for political Affairs and Perez de Cuellar's personal representative announced the agreement of the three countries to participate in indirect talks in June 1982 in Geneva under his good offices to facilitate the search for a just⁴⁵ and lasting political solution.

According to reports - a fair element package was put forward on behalf of the UN Secretary General as a frame of negotiations. It envisaged:

- withdrawal of foreign forces from between Afghanistan and Pakistan and similarly between Afghanistan and Iran, binding the parties to mutual non-interference and respect for sovereignty across established frontiers.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 124.

- international guarantees respecting Afghanistan's non-aligned status.
- voluntary return to their homes of Afghan refugees.

46

The First Round Talks: During the first round talks at Geneva in June 1982, the consultations centred on substantive contents of a comprehensive settlement. The four inter-related elements of a comprehensive settlement as agreed at Geneva were -

- withdrawal of foreign troops;
- non-interference and intervention;
- guarantees of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of the states in the region;
- arrangement for return of refugees to their home.

During the discussions Iran did not participate but kept informed through a representative in Geneva. Careful consideration was also given to modalities and timing of a consultative mechanisms that "will be set in motion to consult refugees in order to ascertain the voluntary character of their returns."

47

The Second Round Talks (April 1983): The Second round of indirect talks between the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan opened in Geneva on April 4, 1983. Like the first

46. Ibid., p. 128.

47. The Asian Recorder, New Delhi, May 28-June 3, 1982, Vol. XXVIII, No. 22, p. 16619.

round this time also Iran did not participate in the discussions but its representatives in Geneva were kept informed about the progress in talks. This time representatives of Afghan refugees were allowed to be present outside the Conference Hall, although no formal consultations were made with them. Soviet advisers, too, were available for consultations in this occasion. According to reports both Afghanistan and Pakistan set down non-interference in each other's internal affairs as a condition for any agreement. Pakistan sources disclosed that the talks resulted in identifying five broad areas for negotiations on which both Pakistan and Afghanistan held divergent positions.⁴⁸

The Third Round Talks (June 1983): The draft of agreement under discussions in this round was based on the following four main points: (1) withdrawal of the estimated 105000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan; (2) cessation of aid to the guerillas; (3) repatriation of refugees; and (4) international guarantees that the settlement will be observed.⁴⁹

However, talks failed to make any major progress on the significant issues which were passed on to third round talks to

48. P.B. Sinha, op.cit., 128.

49. The Asian Recorder, July 30-August 5, 1983, Vol. XXIV, No. 31, p. 17289.

be held in 1984. In the third week of June 1983 Mr Geogi A. Ar-batov, director of the Soviet Union's Institute on USA and Canada said in Geneva that USSR was ready to pull its troops as soon as sufficient guarantees were obtained from Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr Sahibzada Yaqub Khan offered in Moscow to let UN observer check if Afghan rebels operate from Pakistani territory. Also, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the formation of non-aligned government acceptable to Afghanistan people and the return of refugees should form part of any comprehensive settlement that was worked out at Geneva talks.⁵⁰

Fourth Round Talks (1984): The talks began in Geneva on August 24, 1984, in the shadow of Pakistani accusation of air and artillery attacks across its border by Afghanistan. According to UN under-secretary-General Mr Cordovez, although both sides seemed determined to make progress in the talks, there was⁵¹ tremendous distrust between them.

Fifth Round Talks (1985): The fifth round of talks began from August 27, 1985 to August 29, 1985. According to the UN representative Mr Diego Cordovez the US and the Soviet Union had

50. Ibid.

51. The Asian Recorder, New Delhi, September 30, October 6, 1984, Vol. XXX, No. 40, p. 17961.

been asked formally to guarantee a United Nations peace plan for the Afghan conflict and both had expressed interest. But Afghanistan and Pakistan had agreed during the UN sponsored talks in June to ask the super-powers to act as guarantors.

According to Mr Cordovez (1) agreement on non-intervention and non-interference virtually completed, (2) agreement on international guarantor for settlement was also completed (3) agreement on repatriation of more than 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan was almost completed, but (4) finding a way to address the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was under discussion.

Pakistan insisted to set a time-table for the withdrawal of Soviet troops which remained a major obstacle. Despite Afghanistan's insistence that the talks be held face to face, there was little chance for Pakistan to accept it in the next round.

Both the US and the Soviet Union had addressed themselves to this task. The written response of the Soviet Union had reached to Mr Cordovez who presented it to Pakistan for study. A representative of the US also had a meeting with Mr Cordovez during which he gave verbal response. The US was to follow it up with a written response. In their responses both the Super-power⁵² had strongly and unambiguously supported the Geneva process.

52. The Asian Recorder, New Delhi, November 5-11, 1985, Vol. XXXI, No. 45, p. 18587.

Sixth Round Talks (December 1985): A draft agreement had been drawn up for three of the four parts of a final accord - non-interference in Afghan affairs; international peace guarantees; and the return of Afghan refugees. But the Pakistani and Afghan negotiators continued to differ on the inter-relationship of these issues with the actual withdrawal of foreign Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Also, there was another source of basic disagreement whether the talks should be continued in an indirect form as favoured by Pakistan, or conducted directly, as demanded by ⁵³ Afghanistan.

Thus, despite diplomatic consultations to work out the details and essential refinements of these step by step proposals, a settlement of the Afghan problem does not seem to be attainable in the immediate future. This may be explained by the indifference to the viable solution by the Super-powers. But, search for a political solution in Afghanistan has relevance for the stability ⁵⁴ of the whole area from the sub-continent to the Middle East. Given such solution India-Pakistan would certainly undergo more and more normalisation, confidence-building and co-operation in various fields, as has been seen in the previous chapter.

53. The Times of India, New Delhi, December 21, 1985.

54. Jagat S. Mehta, op.cit., p. 152.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to sketch the story of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its impact on India-Pakistan relations. It is a complex story which permits few generalizations or firm conclusions. But it is not without its lessons. The concluding chapter highlights the changing trends in India-Pakistan relations brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the lessons which have been learnt from the experience.

As frequently noted, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was, from the very beginning, the categorical imperative of the Soviet economic and military aid to Afghanistan. In 1921 Afghanistan concluded a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with the Soviet Union, which was again revived in 1931. It has also been seen how having been rebuffed by the United States, Daoud Khan approached the Soviet Union for arms aid and sought Soviet support on Pakhtoonistan issue. The internal struggle for power brought the Saur Revolution of April 1973. Then, in September 1979, Noor Mohammad Tarakki was ousted by Hafizullah Amin without having an adverse impact on the Soviet-Afghan Relations. However, the Soviet intervention took place in December 1979 when Hafizullah Amin was replaced by Babrak Karmal. The various geo-political and geo-strategic compulsions of the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan

have also been examined.

Simultaneously, the part played by Afghanistan in India-Pakistan relations has also been reviewed, before and after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The various efforts made so far to resolve the Afghan crisis in the context of India and Pakistan have also been studied.

As regards India-Pakistan relations, there has been a mutual acrimony between the two countries since 1947. What forms the real impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on India-Pakistan relations? As already made clear, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan Pakistan became a frontline state in the US global strategy in the Second Cold War, which is quite different from the US-Pak relations in the first Cold War. After the exit of the Shah of Iran, only Pakistan could play a vital role in the overall US strategy for the Persian Gulf, serving as an extremely important entreport for the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) mounting into the Persian Gulf from the east. Such developments have necessary implications for India's security. Indian ocean is vital to India's external, political and economic relations. India's entire foreign trade and heavy coastal trade depends on the freedom of Indian Ocean. In case of any turmoil therein, India shall be very adversely affected. Also, the militarily strong Pakistan is likely to threaten the security of India on its northern border. Apart

from the possibility of threats by Pakistan to India's security, the Soviet intervention has affected India vis-a-vis Pakistan in the following ways:

(1) India's stand vis-a-vis the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created more distrust and suspicion between India and Pakistan. India took a regional view of the Afghan problem and suggested political solution on a regional basis without involving the super-powers. India expressed concern more on Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the US than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. India made certain attempts by sending Mr Ram Sathu India's Foreign Secretary and Sardar Swaran Singh to Islamabad to resolve the Afghan crisis. But Pakistan, though initially agreed to, however, refused to seek India's cooperation to resolve the problem. Instead, she internationalized the Afghan crisis and sought to resolve it through the Islamic conference and the UN. Such a divergence in the approaches of the two countries created further misunderstanding between them.

(2) As has been seen, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan added the vigorous intensity to the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, including the nuclear one between India and Pakistan. Pakistan in June 1981 was offered to receive \$ 3.2 billion worth of arms and economic assistance including the F-16

and other ultra-sophisticated arms from the USA. In addition, the US administration also agreed in 1985 to sell \$ 103 million worth of arms including armoured personnel carrier (APC) and 155 mm Howitzer. Both historically as well as strategically there is more possibility of these arms being used against India than against Afghanistan. As a result, India had to match the capabilities of Pakistan by purchasing arms from the USSR, France, England and other western countries and by modernizing its own defence. Besides conventional arms race, nuclear arms race also started. Pakistan is reported to have achieved the capability to go nuclear. This has espoused intense reactions in India where many people have been advocating that India should have nuclear bomb to guarantee its security vis-a-vis-pakistan. Such rivalry is very harmfully having an adverse impact on the confidence-building measures between them.

(3) Such an intense arms race has been acting as the permanent drain on the scarce resources of both the countries. Such expenditure has only blocked resources in non-productive sectors of economy bringing inflation, eating the real income of the lower income groups and thus creating inequality and poverty in the long run. In the short run military expenditure has stimulated demand and boosted employment. In the long run, however, these expenditures are likely to have a negative impact on investment, inflation, employment, balance of payment, industrial production and economic growth. As discussed earlier,

the various poverty alleviation programmes including developmental would have been more effectively employed, had even half of the resources spent on arms and equipments been utilized there, there is likelihood of the negative impact on Pakistan's economy making it more and more dependent on the foreign aid in the long run. Pakistan is likely to have negative impact on its investment, employment, balance of payment and industrial productivity, and thus creating obstacles to the achievement of a self-reliant economic growth. Further, such a huge foreign aid shall impose a great deal of burden on her future generation.

(4) The support and encouragement given by Pakistan to anti-Indian extremists and secessionists has also adversely affected the relations between India and Pakistan. This factor is common between India and Afghanistan, wherein Pakistan and its mentor the United States have been making efforts to destabilise the two countries. As the Afghan rebels continue to get arms, ammunition, equipments, medicines and cash to arrive at the military solution of the Afghan problem, so there is also sufficient evidence to show that some Indian extremists have taken refuge in Pakistan receiving training in guerilla warfare. Their number, according to different sources, varies from two thousand to ten thousand. Further, there were also reports of mass migration of the Sikhs from various parts of India and then push them across-Indo-Pak border, thus setting up Sikh refugee camps on the Indo-Pak border. Further, the role of

pakistan media in distorting events during army action in Punjab, and carrying the interviews with known extremists, created severe apprehension in India and thus making the relations between the two countries more acrimonious.

Recently armed conflicts between the two countries in the Siachen glacier have further added a new and disconcerting dimension to the routine Indo-pak low-level tension. The Glacier is located in the Karakoram Range and thus occupies a position-strategically very important. As discussed already, both India and Pakistan claim this region as the part of their territories while the Indian Army occupies a commanding position in the region. The region missed demarcation during the Simla Agreement (1972) between the two countries.

Besides the above mentioned irritant factors, we have also detailed the various confidence-building measures initiated between India and Pakistan. Immediately after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Mrs. Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India sent the Foreign secretary of India, Mr Ram Sathu, in February 1980 and her special envoy Sardar Swaran Singh in May 1980 to Islamabad. General Zia-ul-Haq agreed to India's cooperation in resolving the Afghan crisis. However, later he categorically ruled out India's cooperation and relied on the Islamic conference and the UN for the purpose. The Islamic conferences (January 1980 and May 1980) failed to facilitate the resolution of the Afghan crisis. Also, the indirect talks between

Pakistan and Afghanistan through the UN under-secretary Mr Diego Cordovez were resumed in June 1982. Since then six round talks have taken place at Geneva between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the mediation of the UN Under-Secretary. But no viable solution has been arrived at. The agreed draft includes - non-interference in Afghan affairs, international peace guarantees and the return to Afghan refugees. But there is disagreement regarding the actual withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

As regards bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, a major step was taken on 10 March 1983 when a joint commission having four sub-commissions dealing with various fields was signed. Since then there have been three meetings of the Commission with four sub-commissions. Consequently, both the countries have agreed for cooperation in agricultural research and promotion in travel and tourism, but failed to reconcile the differences in the crucial trade sector. Recently, the Finance Minister of India, V.P. Singh's delegation, followed by the other led by Defence Secretary S.K. Bhatnagar with peripatetic Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari promise the speeding of the process of normalisation. We have already discussed that V.P. Singh and his aide were able to extract a pledge by the Pakistan side to expand the list of 42 items permitted for private trade to between 200 and 250 items within the March 1986. The second delegation led by the defence secretary discussed the recent armed clashes between the two sides in the Siachen glacier which

is extended for further talks. While Bhandari's talks with his counterparts embrace the entire gamut of Indo-Pakistan relations. The immediate areas of agreement are: One; the acceptance by Pakistan of India's demand over Indian defence personnel who have been reported missing in action. Two, release of the civilian detainees from both sides on or before March 31 this year. While Pakistan's non-aggression pact proposal and India's counter proposal for a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation have found no agreement. The major hurdle in the way are: (i) the concept of bilateralism as a means of solving disputes between the two countries (in view of the Kashmir problem; and the (ii) question of allowing foreign bases on each other's territory (in view of the Afghan problem). While a draft agreement was finalised on the separate issue of mutual pledge not to attack each other's nuclear installations.

SUGGESTIONS

The lessons the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan make it incumbent upon us to find a political solution in Afghanistan which is not only relevant but very important for the stability of the region. It would halt arms race, and thus reduce the defence expenditure which can be utilized for the economic development and amelioration of the socio-economic conditions of the people of India and Pakistan. It will also help in the

normalization of the relations between the two countries and would bring confidence in future by ending mutual distrust and suspicion—the chief characteristics of their relations.

(2) The confidence resulting from the Soviet withdrawal and the mutual understanding shall exercise benign influence on India-Pakistan relations. The Indo-Pakistan boundary represents the political division of a single geographical, ecological, economic and defence unit. The Himalyas and the Karakoram mountains constituting a common line of defence for both the countries impose a geopolitical compulsions on both the states not to deploy their armed forces against each other and thus weaken the external security of the entire sub-continent.

(3) Apart from political considerations India's expansion of trade relations with Pakistan including other Asian countries would promote the diversification of trading areas and the economy in transportation costs. Since Pakistan and India belong to the same ecological regions, their economies are mutually complementary in many ways. There seems to be realisation of this fact on the part of both the countries and, as has been seen earlier, efforts are being made in the direction to promote better economic and trade relations which might ensure the mutual utilization of natural resources and economic development which are essential for both security and development. Besides, socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries shall help in the mutual

understanding of the people of both the countries providing incentive for the aforesaid purpose. The efforts have also been made in this direction.

(4) The resolution of the Afghan problem shall reduce the super-powers presence in the sub-continent. Because it is the mutual distrust and suspicion and its resultant rivalry against each other which creates the problem of security against each other inviting the super powers' involvement in the region. Also, it might reduce tensions in the Indian ocean region which is vital factor for the defence and development of both India and Pakistan. The UN Adhoc committee on Indian ocean, originally scheduled to be held in Colombo in 1981 could not be held due to the opposition of the US and was postponed for 1983 and again for 1984. Till now, the Committee has not been held due the negativism of the United States and others which have taken the position that a conference on the Indian ocean was inopportune so long as Soviet military presence in Afghanistan continued.

Thus, the resolution of the Afghan problem would bring stability in the region and one of the irritant factors in the normalization of India-Pakistan relations - the concept of foreign bases - as discussed earlier, would be removed. Given the favourable regional environment, other irritant factor, namely, the concept of bilateralism in the context of the Kashmir problem, could also be resolved. The recent diplomatic efforts

on the part of both the countries are major steps as regards the future hopes but a little as regards the past experiences.

As a matter of fact, more than thirty eight years of conflict, mutual distrust and suspicion cannot be removed so easily even after the solution of the Afghan problem. The partition of the sub-continent and the continued hostility between India and Pakistan since then have exercised considerable influence both on the internal situations in the two countries and on the external policies pursued by them. Each country functions as a domestic compulsion for the other. The Kashmir problem - a real issue in both countries - has internal political overtones which makes its solution extremely difficult. Furthermore, both the countries have tried to project in international affairs an image quite different from each-other.

Pakistan has not resolved the question of its national identity. She has based her identity not on territory, cultural and heritage of the people as in case of India but on the external heritage of the people namely, Islam. Due to its failure vis-a-vis India to establish a stable political order, Pakistan continues not only to advocate the two-nation theory but also to speak on behalf of Muslims in India. Also, there is anxiety in Pakistan about India not being reconciled to an independent sovereign Pakistan. All these factors have abiding affects on India-Pakistan relations. In addition, serious

differences in the perceptions of the two countries in regard to strategic environment, bilateralism, non-alignment and dispositions of the armed forces; Pakistan's non-acceptance of India's pre-eminence despite her geography, economy and technology and; basic differences in the approaches of both the countries - Pakistani approach being military and security oriented underlying the adversary relationship with India, while Indian approach being political envisaging friendship and cooperations are important factors standing in the way of confidence-building between the two countries.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has not influenced India-Pakistan relations entirely on a new basis-in an abrupt manner. All aspects of their relations having an impact of the intervention, viz- mutual distrust and suspicion due to India's stand vis-a-vis Afghanistan, increasing arms race, nuclear threats, negative impact of the defence spending on the development of both the countries, Pakistan's involvement in India's internal affairs, particularly in the Indian state of Punjab and the endeavours by both countries to have cooperation in various fields, existed before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The intervention only intensified them. Therefore, the resolution of the Afghan problem must be accompanied by considerable goodwill, tenacious efforts and people-to-people understanding to improve the entire gamut of India-Pakistan relations.

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